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Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for the
Common Good
Alexander Tsesis*
This Article argues that the central purpose of U.S. constitutional
governance is the protection of individual rights for the common good.
Members of all three branches of government must fulfill that public trust
through just policies and actions. The maxim of constitutional governance
establishes a stable foundation for the rule of law, requiring government to
function in a nonarbitrarymanner. It provides the people with consistency and
predictabilityabout the scope ofgovernmentalpowers and responsibilities.
The foundational dictate of governance is incorporated into the U.S.
constitutional tradition through the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution. Those two documents reflect the national
commitment to promulgating laws that are conducive to both the public good
and the personalpursuit of happiness. The federal legal system must integrate
protections of rightsfor the common good into statutes, regulations,andjudicial
opinions that address aplethora ofsocial demands andproblems.
The project of maxim constitutionalismruns counter to positivist skepticism
about the validity offundamental constitutionalprinciples. This Article seeks to
demonstrate that maxim constitutionalismreflects the normative underpinningof
legal order that is compatible with pluralisticself-governance. The protection of
rights for the common good facilitates the workings of a polity that tolerates
debate and deliberation. The administration of laws for the public benefit
enjoins tyrannicalmajoritarianismand abuse ofstate authority.
Like originalism, maxim constitutionalism utilizes historicalanalysis. But
it departs from originalism by denying that the original meaning of the
Constitution's text should be determinative. Maxim constitutionalism is a
binding norm that is independent of any individual mindframe, whether past or
present. In addition, though the forward progress of constitutionalism is
informed by judicial opinions, it is not defined by them alone. Congress must
also play a central role in identifying rights and promulgatingstatutesfor their
protection. Recognizing this bedrock purpose of governance distinguishes
maxim constitutionalismfrom prominent strands of living constitutionalism by
furnishing an objective and enduring standardfor evaluating the legitimacy of
governmental actions. The assessment of public conduct is not procedurally
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Siegel, and Lawrence Solum.
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neutral but substantively rich in its account of how governmental actors should
further the public good through a legal system designed to secure life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happinessfor an equal citizenry.
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I.

Introduction

Modem dilemmas about national politics, interstate commerce,
antidiscrimination laws, and a host of other matters simply cannot be
resolved by resort to the constitutional text alone. But where to turn for
clarity? Surely the text must be the starting point, else the Constitution
ceases to be the highest law of the land. Yet the myriad judicial doctrines,
such as the reasonable protection of privacy, that have become part of the
constitutional narrative are binding even though they recognize
unenumerated interests.'
The Judiciary has been the final arbiter of the Constitution's obscure
passages since Marbury v. Madison.2 Yet the Court has not always been
objective in its reading of the Constitution, often issuing political opinions
influenced by the leanings of its members. Its opinions and doctrines have

1. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). Writing for the Court, Justice
Douglas declared:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights.
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether public or
private or parochial-is also not mentioned.... Yet the First Amendment has been
construed to include certain of those rights.
Id.

2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) ("The judicial power of the United States is extended to
all cases arising under the constitution.").
3. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REv. 31, 53-54 (2005) (asserting that "landmark Supreme Court decisions of the past one
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often been influenced by political and social proclivities and contemporary
trends.4 Its ideological and doctrinal fluctuations clearly distinguish the
entity from the fundamental U.S. law that is to guide its decision making.
Stability of constitutional norms, therefore, cannot be based exclusively on
judicial pronouncements.
The Legislative Branch has even less claim to constitutional objectivity
than the Judiciary because senators and representatives are overtly interested
in pursuing popularly supported policies, particularly during election years.
While Congress is directly elected by the people to represent their interests,
the Constitution's internal structure-particularly the separation of
governmental functions-creates checks on lawmakers and their constituents
that are meant to prevent tyrannical majorities from running roughshod over
the rights of minorities.5 Indeed, the colonists made their initial protests,
which eventually led to independence and, consequently, constitutional
ratification, against laws passed by the British Parliament, 6 evincing their
rejection of legislative supremacism.
The notion that the Framers might have placed constitutional definition
in the hands of the President is, of course, entirely specious. Of the three
branches of government, the Framers believed the Executive Branch to be
most prone to corruption.7 The Declaration of Independence is a litany of
accusations against the monarch . A firm constitutional structure delimiting
presidential powers and demarcating rights and principles is necessary to
prevent the exploitation of military command to maintain autocracy.9
Checks and balances on the powers of all three branches limit
government, setting limits on legitimate exercise of powers. The three
hundred years" would have likely come out differently if the Court had "been differently but no less
ably manned").
4. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF

POLITICS IN JUDGING 6 (2010) (describing the concept of "balanced realism," which understands

judges as being influenced by their own political and moral views and personal biases, but also as
constrained by social and institutional factors).
5. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

(articulating the general need for a separation of powers to preserve liberty as well as the specific
need to counteract the inevitable predominance of Congress with bicameralism, different methods
of election, and different principles of action).
6. Widespread colonial opposition to authoritarian British legislation began with objections to
the Revenue Act of 1764, followed by protests against the Stamp Act of 1765 and the Townshend
Duties of 1767.

DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION 27-29 (2012);

JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 37-58 (1992); see ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL
OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 18 (2008).

7. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 306 ("In a government where

numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the
executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the
jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire.").
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-29 (U.S. 1776).
9. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5 (responding to

critical misrepresentations of the new presidential power by listing the specific powers granted to
the Executive under the Constitution).
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branches of government are not only bound by their separate spheres of
authority but also, and more importantly, as this Article seeks to demonstrate,
by the central purpose of protecting rights for the general welfare. By itself,
structural design does not set values, like privacy and justice, that society
requires judges, congresspeople, and presidents to safeguard against arbitrary
intrusions. Substantive public values are necessary for resolving the conflicts
of interest that are inevitable in a pluralistic society.
The Constitution, therefore, provides not merely rules of administration
but also of social ethos. We might expect the underlying purpose of
government to be based on some general principles, exclusive of written
laws; on some intent of the framing or contemporary generation; on the will
of national and state leaders; or on some combination of those factors. In a
representative democracy with a written constitution, the document is a
codification of social ethics conducive to the betterment of the populace as a
whole.10 This perspective differs from the originalist point of view, which
emphasizes the subjective original intents of the Framers, the text's public
meaning at the time of ratification, or some hypothetical reasonable Framer."
By embracing an overarching and enduring principle of representative
governance, my approach also differs from that of living constitutionalists,
who believe progress can be made through judicial precedents with
essentially no reference to constitutional text. 12 Furthermore, I seek to
identify a substantive meaning for the U.S. legal identity that undergirds
procedural justice.
In this Article, I posit that a simple maxim is at the root of the
Constitution. I will be using "maxim" to refer to the directive of
constitutional authority. That maxim is informed by values the people

10. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 196 (1971) ("The citizen accepts a certain

constitution as just, and he thinks that certain traditional procedures are appropriate."); Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech Given at the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/
sourcesdocument7.html (sharing his view that constitutional interpretation requires consideration
of "substantive value choices" and highlighting their application to modem circumstances); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasizing that the exercise of
constitutional interpretation must involve a consideration of the written text but also expressing the
view that what the text tells us is necessarily limited).
11. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989)

(discussing the defects and benefits of originalism as opposed to other methods of constitutional
interpretation).
12. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIvING CONSTITUTION (2010); David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (2003).

Professor Strauss writes:
[I]t is a persistent feature of American constitutional law that while arguments based
on a careful parsing of the text of the Constitution sometimes play a large role in
resolving relatively unimportant issues, the text plays essentially no operative role in
deciding the most controversial constitutional questions (about discrimination,
fundamental rights, and freedom of expression, for example), which are resolved on
the basis of principles derived primarily from the cases.
Id.
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adopted into the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the
Constitution. It mandates the proper scope of sovereign authority, setting
and ordering its priorities. All three branches of government must abide by
its formula for representative governance. Stated briefly, I claim that maxim
or directive for legitimate authority to be: The underlying purpose of
government is to secure equal rightsfor the common good.
That is the people's charge to their representatives and judicial
appointees through the original Constitution and its amendments. And it is
that mandate by which the legitimacy of all federal and state conduct should
be judged.
I begin this Article by laying out the structure of effective social
maxims. I am interested in the extent to which a society can construct a
social ethos through constitutional structure. Part II further examines the
rhetorical effectiveness of maxims as well as how their inclusion in the
Preamble and Declaration have influenced American constitutional history.
Part III places my proposed constitutional maxim within the context of two
constitutional interpretive methods: originalism and living constitutionalism.
The Article ends by demonstrating the maxim's relevance to contemporary
legal issues.
II.

Constitutional Maxim

I begin this part of the Article by developing a general theory of legal
maxims. After defining the concept, I discuss the seminal sources of what I
call American maxim constitutionalism: the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble to the Constitution. Finally, I formulate a universal maxim that
is derived from their general statements on rights and the common good.
The efficacy of any theory of constitutional interpretation will depend,
in no small part, on its ability to appeal to common opinion without being in
flagrant conflict with existing jurisprudence. This Article examines whether
a unified constitutional maxim can appeal to the commonly accepted
principles of normative, procedural, and structural justice.
A.

Maxims

Maxims are rules for governing public or private behaviors. In this
section I will speak of maxims in general terms and will flesh out their
relation to the Constitution in greater detail later in the Article.' 3
In the private realm, maxims are ethical postulates for interpersonal
behaviors. For anyone living in a community, maxims provide normative
baselines for interacting with others. They are general statements of ethics
that are applicable in specific circumstances. Their generality is likely to
generate differences of opinion about content, relevance, and scope. Such
differences are acceptable and, indeed, to be expected in a pluralistic society
13. See infra subpart 11(C).
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that treats individuals with respect. Government (with its constitution,
statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, and directives) is created, in part, to
establish the extent to which ethics are to be enforceable by public
institutions. It must provide individuals with the opportunity to develop
private moralities, be they religious or secular, that they consider to be
uniquely favorable in their pursuits of happiness. Public obligation, on the
other hand, in the form of laws that provide avenues of redress to prevent and
punish disobedience, such as the protection of political involvement or the
enjoyment of public spaces, also places restraints on personal choices
deemed deleterious to some higher purpose.
In the public sphere, where maxims are the sources of laws and
regulations, they are impartial statements of rules that establish the baselines
for legal justification, government structure, and individual rights. 14 At the
foundation of legal authority, that is, in the constitutional context, a universal
rule must be proscriptive on government as a whole, setting a baseline for
legitimate restraints and powers.
Philosophers often associate the term "maxim" with Kantian
philosophy,1 6 So to avoid confusion, it is important at the outset for me to
briefly differentiate my use of the term from its most common usage.
Immanuel Kant used the term in relation to his categorical imperative: "Act
according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal
law."' 7 My explanation of constitutional maxims is related to, but not
identical to, Kant's definition. He refers to a maxim as "a subjective
principle of action." 8 Subjective states of mind help individuals in their

14. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829) (stating that the "rights of personal
liberty" apparently must be protected under "[t]he fundamental maxims of a free government");
Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative

Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 7 n.8 (1955) (asserting that political maxims about government
structure were among the principles embodied "in concrete political forms" that are tied to the
populace); Horace H. Lurton, A Government ofLaw or a Government of Men?, 193 N. AM. REV. 9,

22 (1911) (stating that legislative infringements of "fundamental maxims of a free government"
generally conflict with positive provisions "of both State and National organic law"); see D.S.
Shwayder, Moral Rules and Moral Maxims, 67 ETHICS 269, 275 (1957) ("[M]axims ... will
include principles of impartiality, universality, and the like. Learning the very language of 'right'
and 'wrong' is conjugate with learning maxims. Functioning as they do, maxims want no moral
justification, for they set the boundaries of moral justification.").
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 297-99 (defending the
Constitution's separation of powers by arguing that it is consistent with the separation-of-powers
maxim as conceived by Montesquieu).
16. H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
135-37 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1971) (1947) (explaining the centrality of maxims to Kant's doctrine).
17. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 53
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1949) (1785) (emphasis omitted) (setting out the
form, subject, and characterization of maxims).
18. Id. at 38 n.7; see also PATON, supra note 16 (explaining the relation of Kant's subjective
maxims to objective principles); cf CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS
57 (1996) (asserting that Kant's introduction of the "subjective principle" definition of a maxim was
clumsy (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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daily decision making and vary from person to person based on inclinations,
while objective reasoning pertains to the conduct of all rational beings as
moral agents using human reasoning to govern conduct.1 9 A maxim is
subjective if it is something that cannot be generalized and objective when it
can be made an obligatory rule of conduct for all rational beings. 20 This
distinction strikes me as unconvincing because no rational being can act on
an objective imperative without filtering it through some form of individual
consideration.21
The constitutional maxim I propose is more closely related to what Kant
calls the "objective principle," by which he means "practical law." 2 2 In this
Article, I do not discuss the subjective bases for rational and irrational moral
actions; my focus is rather on a public, social maxim that establishes an
aspirational goal for policy making. The constitutional maxim I formulate in
this Article is that of a public ethos underlying the structural basis of
governance. It is objective but not expected, or even anticipated, to produce
uniform conduct (e.g., never lying, irrespective of the consequences), but
rather complex, contextual thinking about ideals like liberty, equality, and
justice that forces each generation to reassess and evaluate its legal culture
embodied in policies, laws, judicial opinions, and other public practices.
The maxim I formulate need not be connected with Kantian philosophy
or any advancement of it, such as Alan Gewirth's Principle of Generic
Consistency: "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well
as of yourself."2 3 Benjamin Cardozo, before he had become a Supreme
Court justice, may have been correct to say: "Our jurisprudence has held fast
to Kant's categorical imperative.. . . We look beyond the particular to the
universal, and shape our judgment in obedience to the fundamental interest
of society that contracts shall be fulfilled." 2 4 But I do not think it necessary
to import Kantianism into constitutional law; indeed, there are too many
raging debates about Kantian notions of personal autonomy and its obligation
to public duties for me to do them any justice in an article of this scope.25
Jeremy Waldron has recently pointed out that personal autonomy deals with
a person's decision to follow certain desires, while Kantian moral autonomy

19. See Ping-cheung Lo, A CriticalReevaluation ofthe Alleged "Empty Formalism" ofKantian
Ethics, 91 ETHICS 181, 185 (1981) (differentiating Kantian subjective and objective ends).
20. Peter Welsen, Schopenhauer's Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, 61 REVISTA
PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFIA 757, 761 (2005).
21. See Reginald Jackson, Kant's Distinction Between Categorical and Hypothetical
Imperatives, 43 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 131, 155-56 (1943) (arguing that Kant's

differentiation between maxims as subjective and law as objective should be rejected).
22. KANT, supra note 17, at 38 n.7.
23. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 135 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
24. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139-40 (1921).

25. For an exposition of this debate and an attempt to reconcile personal autonomy by theorists
like Joseph Raz and contemporary Kantians like Onora O'Neill, see generally Robert S. Taylor,
Kantian PersonalAutonomy, 33 POL. THEORY 602 (2005).
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relates to an individual's universal obligation to other rational persons.2 6
This Article deals with neither of those two subjects. I am, rather, concerned
with the central obligation of representative democracy in general and its
application to the United States in particular.
The maxim that undergirds the Constitution is not a statement of
personal obligations to autonomous, moral others; rather, it is a statement of
the people's expectations from a representative government answerable to
the will of its constituents and meant to benefit the public good. From the
moral standpoint, the obligation accrues from the nature of each individual
being's ability to act autonomously; from the constitutional standpoint, the
maxim is binding on government actors and concerns their use of power to
fulfill obligations as citizens exercising the public trust. The maxim of
constitutional governance is a general statement of purpose, public objective,
and aim that universally applies to all public action.
A prescriptive maxim in a representative polity dictates universal
governmental obligations but does not provide the detailed content that the
Constitution fills out, statutes detail, and judicial rulings interpret. Maxims'
statuses as the undergirding precepts of governance place a duty on all three
branches of government to set policies consistent with their dictates.27 James
Madison, in a similar vein, related his hope that the American people would
demonstrate "their devotion to true liberty, and to the [C]onstitution" by
establishing a national government that would maintain "inviolably the
maxims of public faith, the security of persons and property, and
encourage[], in every authori[z]ed mode, that general diffusion of knowledge
which guarantees to public liberty its permanency, and to those who possess
the blessing, the true enjoyment of it." 2 8 The nature of government must be
described in general terms against which the uses and abuses of authority can
be tested.
The Constitution sets mandatory guidelines against which ordinary
statutes and government actions must be evaluated. Any state conduct that
29
violates its precepts is illegitimate either on its face or in its application.
The lasting effect and influence of a constitutional principle are based not
merely on its written authority but on its grounding in acceptable legal
mores, which are themselves predicated on decades, or sometimes even
26. Jeremy Waldron, Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy, in AUTONOMY AND THE
CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 307, 307 (John Christman & Joel Anderson eds.,
2005).

27. For a helpful definition of maxims in the moral realm, see Talbot Brewer, Rethinking Our
Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics, 4 ETHICAL THEORY &

MORAL PRAC. 219, 222 (2001) ("Maxims ... come into view when we adopt the interpretive
posture that construes behavior as action, hence as morally assessable.").
28. James Madison, President's Message, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Dec. 6, 1816, at 2.

29. For divergent views on facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, compare Scott A.
Keller and Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes In

Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301 (2012), with Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the
Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).
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centuries, of cultural, political, and judicial developments. A Constitution
that benefits only the few-one that the majority of the population does not
wish and that favors just the privileged-has failed to live up to the common
good by excluding segments of society from the equality of goods.
A written Constitution and its implicit norms must be universal in their
treatment of people in ways that enable society to shed past practices of
discrimination, chauvinism, bigotry, and other historical forms of
intolerance. The Equal Protection Clause, Privileges and Immunities Clause,
Due Process Clause, Guarantee Clause, and a host of other portions of the
Constitution that I will discuss later in more detail, play a role in fleshing out
the contours of representative democracy. They are general and require the
wisdom of all segments of society, and they benefit from a history of legal
trial and error. 30
Respect for tenets best assures compliance with
constitutional norms, which nevertheless remain ineffective without the
regulations needed to morph ideals into enforceable policies. Without civil
rights laws-be it the Civil Rights Act of 1964," the Voting Rights Act of
1965,32 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 3 3-those clauses of
the Constitution remain naught but unfulfilled generalities. The simple
maxim, "Treat other people equally," is meaningful but publicly
unenforceable unless legislators through statutes, judges through judgments,
and the executive through administrative agencies parse who is subject to the
imperative (is it all three branches of government or just some of them?),
what treatment is due (is it action or inaction?), whom "people" refers to (is it
all people or only a certain class of them?), and how equality should be
interpreted within the context of various social and individual interests.
Specific laws are elaborations on more general clauses of the Constitutionlike the Equal Protection and Necessary and Proper Clauses-and
overarching principles of government-like each person having a coequal
entitlement to a fair administration of the laws. The elements of statutes,
therefore, need not be explicitly stated in the Constitution. In enacting them,
Congress should flesh out its explicit and implicit Article I powers, without
abridging the underlying purpose of representative democracy.
The
Judiciary, in turn, should either defer to the legitimate compromises that

30. Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) ("[W]e think the enforced
separation of the races ... neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man,
deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the
laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment .... ), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[W]e hold that the plaintiffs ... are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2006).
32. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006).
33. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C. §§ 225,
611 (2006).
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lawmaking requires or strike laws that cater to special interests in violation of
constitutional limits.
People are more likely to abide by reasonable proscriptions that
positively affect the common good and protect individual rights.34
Government institutions enjoy broader support through consistent and neutral
application of fair statutes that protect constitutional entitlements.
Legislation consistent with constitutional mores is more likely to receive
widespread support and compliance, even when it places limits on conduct.3 6
For the sake of predictability and clarity, maxims must be based on
some authoritative text that supplies key aspects of governance. Even
democracies that have no written constitutions have some statement of
purpose. For instance, in England the Magna Carta sets the baseline for
procedural fairness and bars executive tyranny.3 7
Israel, another
representative democracy that operates without a written constitution, holds
to a principle of equality found in its Declaration of Establishment, which
requires the nation to "ensure complete equality of social and political rights
to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee
freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture."3 Israel's
Basic Law also sets the ideal that in a Jewish and democratic state, "All
persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity."
34. See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) 'Unconstitutional' Laws, 98 VA. L. REV.

1001, 1057-58 (2012) (referring to social theory, which posits that states are more likely to elicit
compliance when they rely on legitimacy-established through fairness and consistency).
35. Id. at 1052-58 (surveying research showing "that it is common for people to evaluate
institutions, including governmental entities, not solely on the basis of the goods they produce, but
also on the basis of whether they behave in a consistent, neutral fashion").
36. I am here extending Immanuel Kant's concept of moral sensitivity and justified "moral
salience" to the constitutional realm. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL
JUDGMENT 78, 83 (1993) (explaining that a "Kantian moral agent" must be "trained to perceive
situations in terms of their morally significant features" and that "[g]ross failures of perception ...
would be counted as marks of moral pathology").
37. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884) (asserting that the Magna Carta
"[a]pplied in England only as a guard against executive usurpation and tyranny"); Gardner v. Trs. of
the Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165-66 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (stating that a riparian right is "an
ancient and fundamental maxim of common right to be found in magna charta"); FRANCIS
STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 368 (2d ed.

1776) (reviewing the Magna Carta "maxim" that "no man shall be taken and committed to prison,
but by judicium parium, vel per legem terrae, that is, by due process of law"); Michael H. LeRoy,
MisguidedFairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award

Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 602 (2008) (stating that an "ancient maxim of fairness" is
contained in "the Magna Carta's injunction that justice delayed is justice denied" (citing MAGNA
CARTA cl. 40 (1215) ("To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice."))).
38. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3 (1948).
39. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391. Several other pluralist
democracies have religious clauses as universal protections of rights within their written
constitutions. For instance, the Constitution of Ireland is promulgated, "[in the Name of the Most
Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom ... all actions ... must be referred," and

acknowledges, "all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ." IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl.,
available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical-Information/About-theConstitution,_Flag,
AnthemHarp/ConstitutionofIreland August_2012.pdf. The Polish constitution asserts that the
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Even a system governed with a unified central purpose requires a
multiplicity of precepts to guide more specific areas of law: To state the
obvious, a one-clause statement of national purpose would never be
sufficient to provide the accountability required of representative
governance. Constitutional principles in a representative democracy must be
general enough to cover a wide variety of foreseeable and unexpected
circumstances that are likely to affect the populace as a whole, rather than
only a portion of the population. 4 0 The Preamble, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Due Process Clause are pregnant with notions of public
safety, evenhandedness, and fair administration but on their face are too
broad to apply to specific cases without additional elaboration. 4 1 Those
portions of the Constitution embody ideals that the nation has recognized
through a complicated system of ratification42 for the benefit of its citizens
and the polity as a whole. The Supremacy Clause holds all levels of
government-the federal, state, and local levels-to some nationally
recognized norms.4 3 Parts of the Constitution are purposefully formulated in

country's "culture [is] rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values."
pmbl.,
available
at
POLSKIEJ
[CONSTITUTION]
KONSTYTUCJA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ
http://www.sejm.gov.p/prawo/konst/angielski/konl.htm. The Greek Constitution sets out that it is
written, "[i]n the name of the Holy and Con-substantial and Indivisible Trinity." 2008 SYNTAGMA
[SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl., available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a237696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf. For a more complete list and discussion
of religious clauses in constitutions see SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 64-70 (2012).
40. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 36 (1981) ("A principle

which is going to be useful as a practical guide will have to be unspecific enough to cover a variety
of situations all of which have certain salient features in common."); Ray Nichols, Maxims,
"Practical Wisdom," and the Language of Action: Beyond Grand Theory, 24 POL. THEORY 687,
691 (1996) ("Maxims' brevity, pith, and point enable them to catch attention and catch in the
memory. When formulated as terse tropes, they compress much into little, so that they can be
variously acted on.").
41. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id amend. XIV, § I (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181 (1999) (relating the
principles of the Preamble "to the principle of universal human rights justifiable by reason in the
service of self-government"); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 711 (2000) (stating that racial profiling "violates fundamental
principles of human dignity at the core of the Equal Protection Clause"); Alexander Tsesis,
Contextualizing Bias Crimes: A Social and Theoretical Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315,
334 n.26 (2003) (reviewing FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW (1999)) (asserting that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are meant to
protect human rights).
42. U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing the process for amending the Constitution); id art. VII
(providing the process for initial ratification of the Constitution).
43. Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 1007 n.177 (2007) ("Supreme Court review of state court
judgments and the availability of the inferior federal courts to assure the constitutionality of state
laws and the states' compliance with federal norms under the Supremacy Clause are fundamental to
the overall operation of the U.S. Constitution and the American court systems."); Alison L.
LaCroix, Federalists,Federalism, and FederalJurisdiction,30 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 236 (2012)
("From a purely structural standpoint, Supreme Court review of state court decisions under the

1620

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

general terms to grant federal and state governments interpretational and
experimentational latitude while staying true to national ideals."
Ordinary people untrained in the law need not remember the precise
language of the Constitution. However, for the principles to have widespread
impact, the public must have an accurate understanding of its substance to
hold government accountable to established standards of public conduct.
Such an understanding is critical for the internalization of ideals that can help
evaluate the legitimacy of state and private conduct. For the people to accept
a public policy, they must regard it to be in accordance with some broadly
conceived ideal of governance, such as fairly apportioned representative
democracy. That ideal encompasses a generally accepted public norm of
political self-determination, given more specificity in the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, from which more detailed legal prescriptions, like
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, can be developed.
In a federal system, the Constitution has a binding effect, setting
common norms for state and federal governments.4 5 States can diverge
widely in their specific policies, but courts remain essential to deciding
whether states' laws violate baseline structural tenets, such as those of
democratic representation; 46 substantive principles, such as those of racial
equality; 4 7 and procedural limitations on the use of power, such as personal
jurisdiction. 48 Those basic elements of government can be modified or

Supremacy Clause might be sufficient to prevent state courts from straying too far from desirable
national norms or engaging in questionable interpretations of the federal Constitution.").
44. States are often regarded as laboratories of political experimentation. This view comes
from Justice Louis D. Brandeis's statement in a case about Oklahoma's right to pass a regulation for
the ice industry. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann has become best known for the statement: "It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country." 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Scholars tend to quote that
passage without continuing on to what comes after it, which points to the supremacy of certain
federal standards: "This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the
statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable." Id. (footnote omitted).
45. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment protection requiring states to provide legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases
who cannot afford to pay for an attorney); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961)
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to state
proceedings); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment
protection of free speech against the states).
46. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (holding that state congressional
districts must adhere to the principle of "equal representation for equal numbers of people");
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (holding that an Alabama law should be
overturned if it were proven that it redrew voting lines to exclude black voters).
47. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (declaring Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute unconstitutional); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overturning the
Topeka school district's policy of racial segregation).
48. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing the
minimum contacts standard for personal jurisdiction); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
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wholly changed by Article V amendments, not ordinary statutory
initiatives.49
The Constitution has so rarely been altered, with only twenty-seven
amendments having been ratified in the course of the document's two-and-aquarter centuries of existence, that a response to contemporary conditions has
often required a modified understanding of the ancient text.50 Any alteration
of meaning through the common law, statutes, or executive orders must
nevertheless maintain fidelity to the Declaration of Independence and
Constitution's main purpose of securing the common good by protecting
inalienable rights.51 This cornerstone of expanding constitutional doctrine
provides a focal point for differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate
changes. A maxim of constitutional government establishes consistent,
fundamental standards for rational social advancement.

462, 472-75 (1985) (determining that jurisdiction over a defendant can be established through
purposeful availment, reasonable anticipation, and relatedness).
49. In this Article I do not have space to address whether so called "superstatutes" may also
achieve constitutional change. For an expostulation of superstatutes, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.
& JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). They

argue that "[a]s a matter of law's hierarchy of formal authority, superstatutes are subordinate to the
Constitution-but in the functional terms of public values and social norms, superstatutes resemble
Constitutional rules" in a variety of ways. Id at 27. Jack Balkin, while not using the term
"superstatute," gives examples of entitlements that have become so fundamental to the United
States' "constitutional regime":
Social Security, Medicare, and other social safety-net programs; national fair labor and
consumer protection standards; federal workplace safety and environmental protection
regulations; a large federal bureaucracy to carry out these programs; centralized fiscal
and monetary policies; an enormous peacetime defensive capability complete with
elaborate intelligence programs and permanent standing armies . . ; civil rights
laws ... ; the Voting Rights Act and other regulations of democratic practice; equal
rights for women; elaborate rules of criminal procedure; and robust free-speech
protections.
Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1129, 1135-36 (2012). To

this list of statutes born on the convictions of social conscience should be added immigration and
naturalization regulations, the Federal Reserve system, the administration of public safety measures
with national implication through the Food and Drug Administration, the national aviation system,
interstate highways, and a variety of programs regarded as essential federal entitlements. But I
remain unconvinced that these carry constitutional force because any of them can be modified,
tweaked, or even altered without going through the complexities of the amendment process.
50. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90, 492-93 (discussing how changes in public education
required a different reading of the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. Jack Balkin has similarly explained that constitutional law develops through "various
constructions, institutions, laws, and practices that have grown up around the text." JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM].

Balkin is

informed by the aspirational values that are embedded in the semantics of the constitutional
language.

See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST

WORLD 231-32 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION] ("Fidelity to original

semantic meaning is consistent with a wide range of possible future constitutional constructions that
implement the original meaning and that add new institutional structures and political practices that
do not conflict with it."). This Article, on the other hand, claims there is a universal principle of
liberal equality for the common good that undergirds the text of the Constitution and governs
constitutional heuristics.
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Inevitably, in a pluralistic democracy like the United States, differences
will arise in emphasis and understanding of history and constitutional norms.
To avoid endless conflicts and constitutional crises, the Supreme Court sets
authoritative definitions of constitutional meaning.5 2 Several scholars,
however, have argued against judicial supremacy in interpretation,
expressing the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Commerce
Clause, the Reconstruction Amendments, and several other constitutional
provisions empower Congress to also identify and enact laws for the
protection of fundamental rights.
More legislative involvement in
interpretation would allow ordinary citizens to further engage in the
development of policies for the protection of rights and the advancement of
general welfare. 5 4
While maxims are overarching legal standards, they are not identical to
legal rules. Maxims are first-order generalizations. They provide broadly
worded principles for governance, not algorithms for proscribing specific
conduct or elements of liability.55
Maxims provide the background
information for consistent, coherent, predictable, and procedurally evenhanded governance. Take, for instance, the maxim that all people have
inalienable rights. For the time being, I am taking this as a given to set the
parameters of the argument, but will link it to the Declaration of
Independence and analyze it later in the Article.
Such a concept is
necessary for determining whether Brown v. Board of Education5 7 or Plessy

52. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury] declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system."). The Supreme Court claims to itself the exclusive
prerogative to define substantive rights implicit in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,
leaving to Congress the subordinate power of correcting state violations of rights that the Court has
previously identified. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) ("Any suggestion that
Congress has a substantive, nonremedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported
by our case law.").
53. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 13 (arguing that responsible public officials can
repudiate the theory of judicial supremacism); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 747, 822-23 (1999) (criticizing the Court for narrowly construing congressional power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: The
American Creed and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REv. 679, 697, 732, 736 (2009)

(exploring the basis for legislative development of civil rights laws that further fundamental
constitutional principles without violating Supreme Court precedents).
54. See Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declarationof Independence, 97 CORNELL

L. REv. 693, 718 (2012) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in City ofBoerne as "effectively
restrict[ing] the people from developing constitutional values through their elected representatives
and plac[ing] the exclusive power to protect rights in the only unelected branch of government").
55. See Nancy Sherman, Wise Maxims/Wise Judging, 76 MONIST 41, 41 (1993) (describing the
categorical imperative in nonalgorithmic terms as requiring assessment of "the salient features of
complex situations," but not as determinative of precise conduct divorced from relevant specificity).
56. See infra section II(B)(1).
57. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools based
solely on race denies equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment). If
the Court had stopped with Brown, an outside observer might have said that segregation was only
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v. Ferguson58 is the correct interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
When the Equal Protection Clause is taken to mean each person is equal to
others by virtue of his or her humanity and is an intrinsic member of the
community whose collective good composes general welfare, then systematic
separation and degradation of the races runs counter to a core constitutional
value.
Maxims are statements of overarching legal commitments to principles
like sovereignty, federalism, justice, and equality. By themselves, maxims
and principles are morally and socially pregnant; however, they only become
enforceable through specific laws and judicial opinions. This is as much true
of the civil rights clauses, such as the Equal Protection Clause, as it is for
structural parts of the Constitution, such as the multiple clauses defining the
functions of the three branches of government. 59
The maxim that government must treat people with equal dignity for the
common good, which I claim is at the root of U.S. constitutionalism, acquires
meaning within the context of specific constitutional clauses and their legal
and cultural interpretation. Legal meaning partly becomes ingrained in
precedent. Standing alone, maxims are necessary to resolving legal disputes,
but they are not sufficient for deciding outcomes. Precedents establish

prohibited at public elementary and secondary schools. Instead, drawing on the decision's
principles of equality and civic participation, rather than narrowly corralling it within the confines
of the specific holding, the Court followed up with a series of per curiam desegregation opinions
that often cited Brown but rarely gave any analysis for extending its holding to segregated facilities
unrelated to education. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61-62 (1963) (per curiam)
(relying on Brown to find that the segregation of public facilities, such as courtrooms, is
constitutionally impermissible); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 353 (1962) (per
curiam) (holding that public segregation in airport dining facilities violates the Fourteenth
Amendment); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir.), vacated per curiam, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (vacating a decision that had declared the segregation of public golf courses to be
constitutional); Dawson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir.), aff'dper curiam, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (finding that racial segregation of public beaches and bathhouses was not
constitutionally permissible); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 205-06 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'dper
curiam, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (granting injunctive relief for the desegregation of a city auditorium).
58. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (deciding that forced segregation on public carriers did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
59. The failure to mention state sovereignty in the text of the Constitution is in contrast with the
Articles of Confederation which stated: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781,
art. II. However, given passages like the Tenth Amendment and the Senate Composition Clause of
Article One, Section Three, that presume sovereign states and the federal government's relationship
to them, federalism is clearly embedded into the Constitution. And while separation of powers is
not explicitly named in the Constitution, the document's structure and history justify it. See
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (holding that in judicial determinations of whether
Congress can restrict the President to remove executive officers, the analysis must be "to ensure that
Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his
constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983) (holding a legislative veto provision to be an unconstitutional
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers).
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analytical tools-such as balancing tests60 and levels of scrutiny 6 -for
constitutional construction. For instance, the truism that courts must protect
constitutional rights against government intrusion provides the necessary
condition for legitimate adjudication 62 but by itself is insufficiently detailed
for resolving specific property, contract, estate, and other disputes. Stare
decisis provides specificity for achieving the ends established through
general statements of socio-legal norms. In the courts, the people effect
constitutional change through individual cases or class actions that are ripe
for adjudication, brought by those with proper standing.
The people also play a legislative role by lobbying their representatives.
The maxim that "state actors treat similarly situated people alike"6 3 sets a
broadly stated norm of governmental action. Its enforcement is made
possible by the Equal Protection Clause, which, in turn, statutes translate into
a cognizable cause of action. Title VII,6 for instance, creates a claim with

60. For a history of the evolution of the judicial balancing tests see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 18, 28, 131
(1992).
61. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089,

1184-85 (2005) (relating the evolution of the tiered scrutiny standards from Carolene Products
through the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts).
62. This maxim is embodied in the seminal Carolene Products footnote. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). At its core, Justice Harlan F. Stone's famous
statement asserted the legitimacy of judicial oversight of state actions that arbitrarily harm minority
interests: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
at 153 n.4. That dictum later became the cornerstone for heightened judicial scrutiny. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1288 (2007) (following the
development of the Court's position that some rights enjoy a preferred position).
63. See McDonald v. City of Saint Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 705 (8th Cir. 2012) ("In general, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that state actors treat similarly situated people alike." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Rylee v. Chapman, 316 F. App'x 901, 907 (1Ith Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat
similarly situated people alike."). The Supreme Court regards the Equal Protection Clause to be
"essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). This maxim is fleshed out in a variety of
other cases holding that the state cannot treat similarly situated persons differently absent some
reason. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 597 (2008); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000) (per curiam). The maxim of equality evolved significantly earlier than the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. More than two thousand years ago, the philosopher Aristotle wrote that,
"Democracy ... arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all
respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal." 2 ARISTOTLE, Politics,
in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE V.1.1301a28-1301a30, at 1986, 2066 (Bollingen Series
No. 71, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation).
64. Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination:
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

2013]

Maxim Constitutionalism

1625

specific elements and available remedies meant to hold responsible
employers for violating the maxim of equality by infringing the rights of
employees because of their sex, race, religion, color, or national origin.6 5 On
the structural side, federalism is nowhere explicitly found in the Constitution,
but precedent and U.S. culture have made it among the most stable
constitutional values for gaining an individual voice in the administration of
goods and services. This unwritten, structural constraint on the uses of
federal power is linked to specific provisions of the written Constitution,
such as the Tenth Amendment,66 Guarantee Clause, 7 Necessary and Proper
Clause,68 and Supremacy Clause.69 At a more concrete level, the Court has
found that Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures to avoid violating
the sovereignty of the states. 70 Congress may nevertheless set limits in
safeguarding individuals' ability to enjoy the benefits of organized society

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
The Supreme Court upheld Title VII under the Commerce Clause, but Congress passed the
statute pursuant to that and its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Congressional authority to enact the
provisions of Title VII at issue in this case is found in the Commerce Clause and in § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)); Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 498-99 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("Title VII was passed pursuant to congressional authority under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.").
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
66. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (asserting that the Tenth
Amendment differentiates between the powers of the federal and state sovereigns).
67. The Supreme Court has stated that the Guarantee Clause "presupposes the continued
existence of the states and ... those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their
sovereign and reserved rights." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1938)).
68. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967-68 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that the "essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; [this] is a factor suggesting that the power is not one
properly within the reach of federal power").
69. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (asserting that "the States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by
the Supremacy Clause").
70. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (asserting that Congress cannot
"commandeer" the state legislative process (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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through laws like the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Actn and
Medicaid.7 2
B.

Textual Source of ConstitutionalDirective

Authoritative text is needed to transform maxims from a series of
unrealized goals into enforceable norms.
In the United States, the
Constitution is regarded to be the sole fundamental law with supreme
authority over any other public mandate. Its provisions incorporate the more
fundamental principles of justice and political accountability, which predate
the Constitution and are predicated on the postulate that all people have equal
intrinsic rights (to such conduct as travel, speech, the formation of
relationships, safety, etc.) that government must protect for the public good.7 3
Official misconduct that violates this objective of governance is illegitimate
and undermines the people's sovereign directive to form government
responsible for representing their interests and protecting their individual,
nonintrusive pursuits of happiness.
The maxim of equal rights for the public good is an abstract concept,
one that has moral or philosophical value but only becomes a constitutional
norm through formal adoption. At the country's founding, the Declaration of
Independence adopted a normative structure that recognized the equality of
human rights,74 asserted that the people are the source of sovereignty,75 and
76
required public officers to answer to the will of their constituents.
The Declaration's statement of national principles is often overlooked in
constitutional discourse but should be understood to be relevant to
interpretation of the Constitution's text and ethos. 77 The Declaration of
Independence is a substantive statement of rights and representative
democracy. The Preamble to the Constitution is likewise typically thought to
be unenforceable,7 8 despite its overarching statements of national purposes
71. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (asserting that
"[n]othing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to
expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with
the conditions on their use" but prohibiting Congress from penalizing nonparticipating states).
72. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990) (determining that a "provision of
federal funds is expressly conditioned on compliance with the amendment and the Secretary is
authorized to withhold funds for noncompliance with this provision").
73. See Alexander Tsesis, Undermining Inalienable Rights: From Dred Scott to the Rehnquist

Court, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1179, 1184-86 (2007) (surveying Revolutionary literature and determining
that "an undeniable commitment to inalienable rights permeated early American theory of
government").
74. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. See Tsesis, supra note 54, at 70 1-10 (discussing the legitimate role of the Declaration of
Independence in constitutional interpretation).
78. Milton Handler, Brian Leiter & Carole E. Handler, A Reconsideration of the Relevance and
Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 117, 119-23,

123 n.22 (1990) (explaining the "uncontroversial and perfectly consistent" proposition-argued by
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and governmental obligations. These two texts jointly require all three
branches of government to protect rights for the common good. Both the
Declaration and the Preamble contain guiding principles about governmental
powers, duties, and limitations. Despite the Supreme Court's relative neglect
of those documents, throughout the nation's history progressive movements
have incorporated them into their demands for social change.79
1. Declaration of Independence.-The Continental Congress adopted
the Declaration of Independence to explain the purposes of the American
Revolution and set norms for representative politics.so A review of principles
the nation espoused in this statement of its ideals reveals contours of the
founding social maxim to safeguard inalienable rights and the pursuit of
happiness through representative governance.81 The Declaration asserted
some of the ideals of representative governance that were often voiced in the
colonies prior to its adoption.82 It left a deep imprint on the civic
expectations of its contemporaries and those of future generations. 83

Justice Harlan and reiterated by other courts-that the Preamble to the Constitution "has never been
regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United
States").
79. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 38-41 (2005)
(highlighting Virginia and Francis Minor's use of the Preamble to support their argument for
women's suffrage); Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 362 (1993)
(referencing famous speeches that invoked the "eternal" language of the Declaration of
Independence-Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and Martin Luther King Jr.'s speech at the Lincoln
Memorial-and their associated social movements to show that "[t]hroughout our history, most
Americans have regarded the Declaration of Independence as expressing the greatest ideals of this
country").
80. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF

POLITICAL IDEAS 6 (1922) ("The ostensible purpose of the Declaration was, therefore, to lay before
the world the causes which impelled the colonies to separate from Great Britain."); Robert N.
Clinton, Original Understanding,Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof "This Constitution," 72
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1222 (1987) (discussing the "basic normative principles" announced in the
Declaration of Independence).
81. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
82. Two signers of the Declaration commented on the document's reliance on commonly
accepted colonial thought. Richard Henry Lee and John Adams asserted that the document was
unoriginal. To their claims, Jefferson responded that he had all along wanted it to reflect the
political climate of America rather than his personal views. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry
Lee (May 8, 1825), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 342, 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
N.Y.C., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899) (stating that the Declaration of Independence "was intended to
be an expression of the American mind"). Adams, who would later serve as President of the United
States, and one of the most powerful representatives to the Continental Congress, wrote that there
"is not an idea in [the Declaration] but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years before."
2 JOHN ADAMS, Autobiography, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 503, 514 n.1 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1850).
83. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1 (2012) ("A closer look at more than two centuries of speeches
and writings reveals that the Declaration of Independence has had a remarkable influence on
American policy making.").

1628

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

The Declaration's statements against George III contrasted the policies
of autocratic rule with the newly founded country's duty to safeguard the
inalienable rights of the people. 84 Some paragraphs condemned the British
monarch for refusing to respond to colonists' petitions for representation in
Parliament.
Colonial representatives also adopted the statement that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Thomas Hartley, a member of the Pennsylvania ratifying
Happiness."8
convention, explained the meaning of this section of the Declaration:
As soon as the independence of America was declared in the year
1776, from that instant all our natural rights were restored to us, and
we were at liberty to adopt any form of government to which our
views or our interests might incline us.-This truth, expressly
recognized by the act declaring our independence, naturally produced
another maxim, that whatever portion of those natural rights we did
not transfer to the government, was still reserved and retained by the
people ... 87
Elsewhere, an unidentified author wrote that the United States
determined that "if universally embraced, . .. the maxim, that 'all men are
born free, equal, and independent"' would "render the human race secure and
happy."88 These statements were only the first attempts at understanding the
Declaration's implications for constitutional democracy. Every generation
since then has put effort into explaining and defining the document's
meaning.89
The Declaration's axiomatic statement about human nature and
government obligations was inspirational to a variety of progressive social
movements, like the feminist movement and the abolitionist movement, who
understood its ideology to apply to all the people, not merely to white men.90

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 6-7 (U.S. 1776).
Id. paras. 5, 30.
Id. para. 2.
State Convention, Friday,November 30, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Jan. 3, 1788, at 2.
From the Republican Ledger, The Examiner, No. VII, CONST. TELEGRAPHE (Bos.), Feb. 1,

1800, at 1 (asserting this statement of human rights in defense of the French Revolution).
89. See Colloquy, Fidelity as Synthesis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581 (1997).
90. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY 3-4 (Phila., Anti-Slavery Soc'y 1861), available at http://archive.org/

stream/declarationofsen0Oamer#page/n5/mode/2up (calling the Declaration of Independence and its
guarantee of "life, LIBERTY, and the pursuit of happiness" the "coiner-stone" of the country); THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT WORCESTER, OCTOBER 15TH

AND 16TH, 1851, at 11 (N.Y.C., Fowlers & Wells 1852), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/naw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28rbnawsan8287 divl%29%29. The resolution
advanced at that convention stated:
Whereas, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, all men
are created equal and endowed with inalienable Rights to Life, Liberty, and the pursuit
of Happiness; therefore, Resolved, That we protest against the injustice done to
Woman, by depriving her of that Liberty and Equality which alone can promote
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While their views did not figure into antebellum government decisions, these
social activists were instrumental in developing the cultural progress needed
for formulating the Due Process, Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91
Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the Declaration clearly
committed the nation to rely on the "just [P]owers" derived "from the
Consent of the Governed" in order "to secure" equal liberty for all
Americans, irrespective of their state of origin. 92 The purpose for consenting
to a unified national authority was clearly to establish safeguards for the
inalienable rights that the document acknowledged to be the birthright of all
people. The Declaration of Independence was a sophisticated compact that
explained the unity of liberty and equality into "a maxim worthy of the
dignity of man." 93 This commitment to joint government united all thirteen
colonies.
Contrary to the claims of some scholars, the founding generation
understood the Declaration of Independence to be more about equality than a
collective right to oppose tyranny, although that certainly was part of the
manifesto's meaning. 9 4 For some of the most influential Founders, the
Declaration was more than a statement of sovereignty. It expressed universal
principles about intrinsic human worth. James Wilson, who was later a
member of the Constitutional Convention and then the Supreme Court of the
United States, asserted that the statement of equality and inalienable rights
found in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence provided
the "broad basis on which our independence was placed." 95 He further
asserted that the system of the Constitution was erected "on the same certain
and solid foundation." 96 On this reading, the Constitution's specific grants of

Happiness, as contrary alike to the Principles of Humanity and the Declaration of
Independence.
Id.
91. See, e.g., TSESIS, supra note 6, at 100 (claiming that the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated traditional abolitionist natural rights views, allowing the Amendment's
future reach to extend far past the contemporary sensibilities of the Framers).
92. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

93. See New-York, October 2, YOuTH'S NEWS PAPER (N.Y.C.), Oct. 7, 1797, at 16 (asserting
that "[I]iberty and equality well explained and understood" is such a maxim).
94. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, Fitly Spoken, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/
book/review/liberty-equality-alexander-tsesis?page=0,1 (rejecting the view that the Declaration was
meant to be a universal statement of equality and arguing for the more narrow reading). While
colonists sought primarily to assert their independence by explaining the rationale for the
revolution, they also thought it of vital importance to explain the principles for governance binding
on the newly independent nation. Cf DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A

GLOBAL HISTORY 21 (2007) (asserting that "[t]he primary purpose of the American Declaration ...
was to express the international legal sovereignty of the United States" and thus claiming less
import for the statements of universal rights).
95. 1 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
ON
CONSTITUTION, PROPOSED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 59, 63 (1788).

96. Id. at 63.

THE
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power were predicated on the principles adopted into the Declaration of
Independence. Samuel Adams, one of the most influential Revolutionary
leaders and a signer of the document, was more specific in explaining how
the Declaration helped frame U.S. social ethics. As acting governor for the
state of Massachusetts, he asserted to both branches of the state's legislature
that when "the Representatives of the United States of America" agreed "all
men are created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights," they proclaimed "the doctrine of liberty and equality" to
be part of the "political creed of the United States."97
The great Quaker abolitionist Anthony Benezet wrote that the
guarantees of the U.S. creed covered all colonial inhabitants, irrespective of
race and class. The Declaration's statements about the people's right to
separate from Great Britain, he wrote, "apply to human nature in general,
however diversified by colour and other distinctions."98 Just two years after
the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, Benezet
already believed that its statement about "all [m]en [being] created equal"
with the inalienable rights of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness"
placed certain moral demands on the nascent nation. 99 The document's
binding recognition of rights and statement against political oppression were
also a telling condemnation "against the slavery of the Negroes." 0 0 In the
same year, 1778, Jacob Green delivered a sermon in New Jersey. Like
Benezet, Green expostulated about the incompatibility of the Declaration's
statements of human equality and entitlement to liberty with the retention and
promotion of slavery. 10 Understanding of the Declaration as a statement of
the nation's commitment to the universal rights continued into the next
decade. In a two-column side-by-side presentation, New Jersey Quaker

97. Samuel Adams, Mass. Lieutenant Governor, Speech to the Massachusetts House of
Representatives and Senate (Jan. 17, 1794), in MASS. MAG., Jan. 1794, at 59, 63 (emphasis
omitted).
98. ANTHONY BENEZET, SHORT OBSERVATIONS ON SLAVERY 2 (Phila., Joseph Crukshank
1781). For a similar reliance on the Declaration as a statement of national principle, see THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY, FOR PROMOTING THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY,
AND THE RELIEF OF FREE NEGROES, UNLAWFULLY HELD IN BONDAGE 21 (Phila., Francis Bailey
1788); JAMES DANA, THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE. A DISCOURSE DELIVERED IN THE CITY OF
NEw-HAVEN, SEPTEMBER 9, 1790, BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF
FREEDOM 28 (New Haven, Thomas & Samuel Green 1791); WARNER MIFFLIN, A SERIOUS

EXPOSTULATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES 9 (Phila., Poughkeepsie, Dutchess Cnty. 1794).
99. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
100. ANTHONY BENEZET, SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT SUBJECTS; VIZ.
ON WAR AND ITS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE GOSPEL. OBSERVATIONS ON SLAVERY. AND
REMARKS ON THE NATURE AND BAD EFFECTS OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS 28 (Phila., Joseph

Crukshank 1778).
101. JACOB GREEN, A SERMON DELIVERED AT HANOVER (IN NEW-JERSEY) APRIL 22D, 1778.
BEING THE DAY OF PUBLIC FASTING AND PRAYER THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 12-13 (Chatham, N.J., Shepard Kollock 1779).
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David Cooper drew readers' attention to the Declaration of Independence's
statement of rights and obligations, while on the right-hand column he wrote:
If these solemn truths, uttered at such an awful crisis, are selfevident: unless we can shew that the African race are not men, words
can hardly express the amazement which naturally arises on reflecting,
that the very people who make these pompous declarations are slaveholders, and, by their legislative conduct, tell us, that these blessings
were only meant to be the rights of whitemen not of all men ...102
Taking the Declaration outside the realm of religious dialogue, in a
speech before the American Philosophical Society, George Buchanan quoted
the document to demonstrate that its principles were incompatible with the
oppression of the "[u]nfortunate Africans."10 3 These antislavery views were
by no means held by all Americans, but they demonstrated that from the time
of the nation's founding, a variety of visionary thinkers regarded the
Declaration to be an inspirational statement of government obligation to
protect intrinsic human freedom on an equal basis.
The Declaration of Independence so quickly gained colonial assent
because its author, Thomas Jefferson, drew his inspiration from ideas about
governance that enjoyed widespread support throughout the colonies. 104 His
contemporaries distinguished the "maxim" of "[1]iberty and equality," which
was thought to be "worthy of the dignity of man," from the privileges of
European nobility.105
The Declaration's maxim of universal rights set a norm that made
government beholden to the people and their will to pursue happiness and the
Writing in a weekly Philadelphia newspaper, a
general welfare.106

102. DAVID COOPER, A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO THE RULERS OF AMERICA, ON THE
INCONSISTENCY OF THEIR CONDUCT RESPECTING SLAVERY: FORMING A CONTRAST BETWEEN THE
ENCROACHMENTS OF ENGLAND ON AMERICAN LIBERTY, AND, AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN

TOLERATING SLAVERY 12 (Trenton, N.J., Isaac Collins 1783) (emphasis omitted).
103. GEORGE BUCHANAN, AN ORATION UPON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL EVIL OF SLAVERY

13-14 (Balt., Philip Edwards 1793).
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, supra note 82, at 343 (asserting that he did
not seek "to find out new principles, or ... merely to say things which had never been said before[,]
but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject" that reflected the "sentiments of the
day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of
public right").
105. New- York, October 2, supra note 93; see also Hints for a Form of Government for the
State of Pennsylvania,PA. EVENING POST (Phila.), July 16, 1776, at 351 (proposing the formation
of a Legislative Council in order to give "great security to public counsels, and prevent[] rash acts
of government").
106. 1make no attempt here to fully define the terms "happiness" and "general welfare." Stated
briefly, my position is neither empirical utilitarianism, hedonism, nor deontology. I have adopted
the term maxim constitutionalism to designate my approach, which claims that following a maxim
committed to the protection of fundamental human entitlements is most likely to lead to general
welfare. My approach is closely analogous to rule utilitarianism but differs from it because I rely on
a fundamental maxim of conduct rather than a plethora of rules.
I believe that the public sphere requires the principled administration of law. The equitable
exercise of government authority to protect individuals is necessary for the elevation and expansion
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contributor stated that the same "[s]ages, who penned the Declaration of
Independence, laid it down, as a fundamental principle, that government
derives its just powers from the consent of the people alone."' 7 Prior to the
ratification of the Bill of Rights, and later the Reconstruction Amendments,
the Declaration of Independence was the most detailed statement of the
directive for government to safeguard liberty and equality. 0 8 Echoing the
sentiments of the Declaration, an author calling himself simply
"A Ploughman" wrote in a Philadelphia newspaper, "It is a general maxim
that government was instituted for the protection and happiness of the
people." 09 The idea of popular government was very different for the
revolutionary generation than for us-they accepted and participated in
conduct toward women and minorities that we are now aware violated the
very principles laid down" 0-but the shortcomings of their conduct does not
gainsay the continued worthiness of the universal ideals for governance they
established.
The act of independence was meant to grant the people power over their
political, civil, and social destinies. Constituting a government to effect the
people's "Safety and Happiness""' required the passage of laws that
foreseeably placed limits on individual liberty to protect the common good.
In the words of a contemporary, a "fundamental maxim" of lawmaking was
"that a part of our liberty must be given up for the security of the rest.""12
Limits on liberty were necessary for securing civil equality. Natural liberty,
as Samuel Adams explained, could be "abridged or restrained, so far only as
of public happiness and overall welfare. Checks and balances on the three branches of government
are made to protect the individual from official overreaching and to facilitate debate about how best
to achieve the public good. Respect for individuals and a rational policy for achieving social
improvement are intrinsic to the pursuit of happiness. Certain rules of social conduct, developed
through representative governance, are critical to the pursuit of the common good.
Constitutionally protected well-being is the integration of social satisfactions, obtained through
public institutions like representative governance, and personal satisfaction with one's life and
available opportunities for succeeding. Without reasonable regulation for justly resolving conflicts
of interest, powerful interests can exploit their positions to unfairly, inequitably, and arbitrarily
amass goods at the expense of outside groups. The pursuit of happiness, thus, requires fair laws that
benefit the common good by protecting individuals' quest for personal aspirations.
107. American Intelligence, FREEMAN'S J.; OR, N.-AM. INTELLIGENCER (Phila.), Aug. 24, 1791,

at 3.
108. See Debates in the Pennsylvania State Convention, For and Against the Federal
Constitution, WORCESTER MAG., Dec. 1787, at 163, 164 (arguing that the first two paragraphs of

the Declaration of Independence better protect people's rights than the original Constitution).
109. A Ploughman, To the People, INDEP. GAZETrEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1782, at 1.
110. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing
that the whole number of "free Persons" and three-fifths of persons who are not free be added for
purposes of legislative apportionment); MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE
REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 45-46 (1980) (commenting

that colonial common law did not give married women the right to "sue or be sued, draft wills,
make contracts, or buy and sell property").
Il l. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
112. Miscellanies, NEW-HAVEN GAZETTE & CONN. MAG., Mar. 1, 1787, at 9 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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is necessary for the great end of society."" 3 According to this model, legal
limits should provide the preconditions necessary for each person to be able
to improve his or her capabilities to live a fulfilling life. For instance,
property rights place limits on acquisition, use, and control of chattel and real
estate.l 14 These limits are necessary for each person to be safe in the
enjoyment of possessions knowing that legal prescriptions place reciprocal
obligations on each member of society." 5
A representative republic's ultimate goal was to provide laws conducive
to happiness. Because they constituted the final authority, the people could
steer government to develop opportunities for living contentedly. John
Adams expressed an oft-stated theme in his Thoughts on Government that
"happiness of society is the end of government."I 16 Along these lines,
Dickinson thought the "right to be happy" was attainable only in a free
society." 7 Indeed, where a government did not promote the welfare and
happiness of the people, it was their right to "amend, and alter, or annul, their
Constitution, and frame a new one."" 8 Years before the Revolution, James
Otis Jr. eloquently described the government's duty "to provide for the
security, the quiet, and happy enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. There
is no one act which a government can have a right to make, that does not
tend to the advancement of the security, tranquility and prosperity of the
people." 19
On a structural level, the Declaration established several key
components of constitutional governance over a decade before the
Philadelphia Constitutional Convention. The Declaration of Independence's
recitation of reasons for independence made clear that the new government
would need to separate the responsibilities of the Executive and Judicial
Branches of governmentl 20 and the Executive and Legislative Branches of

113. Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists, A List of Violations of Rights and a Letter of
Correspondence (Nov. 20, 1772), availableat http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right col.htm.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 157-66, 222A-42 (1965) (outlining causes of
action for trespass to land and conversion).
115. GEWIRTH, supra note 23, at 240-41.
116. 4 JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 193, 193
(Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1865).
117. 1 JOHN DICKINSON, An Address to the Committee of Correspondencein Barbados, in THE
WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 251, 262 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Phila., Historical Soc'y of Pa.
1895) (arguing that "[i]f there can be no happiness without freedom, I have a right to be free")
(emphasis omitted).
118. Letter from Samuel Adams to John Adams, (Nov. 25, 1790), in 4 SAMUEL ADAMS, THE
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 344, 344 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1908).
119. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 10 (Bos.,
Edes & Gill 1764).
120. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (asserting several
condemnations against the King of England: "He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for
the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries").
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government.1 2 1 The separation of the Legislative and Judicial Branches
would come later, in the text of the Constitution. But the ideal of separating
the function of the three branches came even before July 4, 1776, with some
in the popular press going so far as to call it a maxim of governance.122
Recognizing separation of powers to be fundamental for government, a
citizen from Pennsylvania wrote that, "It is a determined maxim in politics,
that the legislative and executive powers of government should be carefully
kept separate and distinct."1 23 James Madison likewise took the "political
maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be
separate and distinct" to be essential for constitutionalism. 124
Among other elements of the future Constitution that the Continental
Congress first set down in the Declaration was the requirement that a
representative polity must be beholden to the will of the people. 125 In this,
the document adopted an accepted maxim that wisdom of governance lies
with the body of the people.126 A decade later, in the 1780s, a New York

121. See id para. 7 ("He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with
manly Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People."). The reverse is also true. Congress
cannot use its authority to infringe on Article II powers. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726
(1986) ("Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the
execution of the laws except by impeachment.").
122. For a contemporary example of an author who regarded political-branch separation to be
"a maxim in government," see American News: Philadelphia, Feb. 11, PA. MERCURY & UNIVERSAL
ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. I1, 1785, at 3. See also Instructions to the Representatives of the Town
of Boston, NEW ENG. CHRON. (Bos.), May 30, 1776, at 2 ("'Tis essential to Liberty, that the
legislative, judicial and executive Powers of Government, be, as nearly as possible, independant
[sic] of, and separate from each other."); Williamsburg, May 24, PA. EVENING POST (Phila.), June 6,
1776, at 281 (reprinting the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which included a provision "[t]hat the
legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judicative").
123. A Citizen, A Word of Advice: or, The Pennsylvania Assemblyman's Vade Maeum, PA.
PACKET (Phila.), Nov. 5, 1785, at 2.
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 297. In Federalist48, James
Madison pointed out that the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive or Legislative
Branches can lead to tyranny. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 306-07.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist73, pointed out that the Judiciary too can become a tool
for tyranny if it becomes overly entangled in executive politics. THE FEDERALIST No. 73
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 445. Hamilton argued against Anti-Federalists who were
concerned that the exclusive concentration of power in the Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution would result in an entity that could mold the meaning of the document to its own
opinion with no possibility of revision by the Legislature. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 5, at 481-90.
125. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring it to be "the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish" tyrannical government "and to institute new Government, laying its
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness"). A contemporary expounded on the relation of the
Declaration's statement between "self-evident" truths and voting by quoting from the document and
then asserting: "This equality and-what is consequential to it-the unerring maxim that
governments derive their just powers from the people, have been maintained by those great and
good men of all nations whose labours have benefitted mankind. . . ." To the Legislature of the
State ofNew-York, Letter II, REPUBLICAN WATCH-TOWER (N.Y.C.), Mar. 5, 1803, at 2.
126. A Dialogue Between a Ruler and a Subject, ESSEX GAZETTE (Salem), Mar. 24, 1772, at
138 ("[IIt is an old maxim, that the body of the people never can be deceived; that the wisdom of
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author explained that it was well-established that, "it is a fundamental maxim
in this government, that the people should chuse [sic] their ...
magistrates.",127
The Declaration made clear that a representative
government must respond to political petitions.
The Declaration of Independence set a baseline expectation of
representative governance.' 28 The document was still a rough sketch with
much need of elaboration. Professor Jack Balkin has similarly asserted,
"American constitutionalism is and must be a commitment to the promises
[of] the Declaration."l 29
Details of how the Declaration's visionary
statements might be carried out would come first and foremost from the
Constitution, which defined the powers of government and proclaimed its
purpose to be the protection of liberty and the promotion of the general
welfare.
2. Preamble to the Constitution.-The Declaration of Independence
was written by Thomas Jefferson, adopted by the Continental Congress, and
approved by the states, 130 but the power to pass it came from the people, who
emerged from colonialism into a newly formed national community.' 1 The

the state lies with them, and they always judge right with regard to the conduct of their rulers."); By
the Great and General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, PA. EVENING POST (Phila.),
Feb. 27, 1776, at 99. The author noted:

It is a maxim that in every government, there must exist somewhere, a supreme,
sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable [sic] power: But this power resides always in
the body of the people; and it never was, or can be delegated to one man, or a few; the
great Creator having never given to men a right to vest others with authority over them,
unlimited either in duration or degree.
Id.; Litchfield, April 12, WKLY. MONITOR (Litchfield, Conn.), Apr. 12, 1785, at 3 ("That, 'the
supreme power in a republican government must ever remain with the people,' is a maxim no less
rational than necessary . . . .").
127. Cato, From the New-York Packet: To the Considerate Citizens of the State of New-York,
INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Dec. 6, 1786, at 3.
128. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 4-5 (1991) ("The principal

drafter of the Declaration of Independence held the view-indeed was the architect of its
expression, for the Declaration is the political basis for the idea of the constitution-that the state
was the creation of sovereign power, not the other way around.").
129. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 51, at 18.
130. TSESIS, supra note 83, at 12-31 (narrating events surrounding the drafting, adoption, and
acceptance of the Declaration).
131. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (declaring independence
"in the Name, and by Authority of the good People"); id. para. I ("[Ilt becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God entitle them . . . ."); id. para. 2 ("[W]henever ... Government becomes
destructive . . . , it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."); id. para. 30 ("A Prince whose
Character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free
People."). One of the functions of the Constitution, as James Madison explained it, is to protect the

aggregate interest of the community against political factions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison), supra note 5, at 75-79 (noting that a republican government, which the Constitution
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Constitution, which Congress passed eleven years after independence, was a
more pragmatic document than its 1776 progenitor, but it retained the
people's will to establish a government favorable to their collective
interests. 132 The Constitution sets out the structure of government while the
Declaration remains the source of ideals that should inform the exercise of
authority. The Declaration remains a statement about the legitimacy of
revolution in response to tyranny and oppression, while the Constitution
establishes institutional powers for the exercise of public offices. 1 33
With no bill of rights in the original Constitution, the Preamble set a
national norm for government to safeguard liberty for the general welfare.
The Preamble asserted that the good to be achieved by government should
inure to the population of all the states.1 34 According to an accepted maxim
of interpretation, contemporaries of the Constitution believed that the
Preamble asserted the primary objectives of the Constitution as a whole. 13 5
Those objectives included the security of inalienable rights.13 6 While it did

would empower, could help guard the public good against harm from factions regardless of whether
they make up a minority or a majority of citizens).
132. See Jack N. Rakove, Joe the PloughmanReads the Constitution, or, The Poverty ofPublic
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 597 (2011) ("The 'We the People' of the

Preamble is manifestly an expression or instantiation of a people's fundamental right, proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence, 'to alter or to abolish [governments], and to institute new
government . . . .' (alteration in original)).
133. Alex Gourevitch recently described an on-point dichotomy between the Declaration of
Independence as a revolutionary document, to which progressive social movements turned for ideas,
and the Constitution, which he refers to as "a body of established doctrine and law" that demands
"authoritative interpretation." Alex Gourevitch, The Contradictionsof Progressive Constitutional-

ism, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1159-60 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
134. One of the Preamble's greatest contemporary expositors, James Wilson, delegate to the
Pennsylvania constitutional ratifying convention, explained the great balance between state
sovereignty and the good of the nation: "[W]hat is the interest of the whole, must, on the great scale,
be the interest of every part. It will be the duty of a State, as of an individual, to sacrifice her own
convenience to the general good of the Union." James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania
Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at

391 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Phila., Historical Soc'y of Pa. 1888).
135. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 459 (Bos., Billiard, Gray & Co. 1833) (asserting that "[i]t is an admitted maxim in the ordinary
course of the administration of justice" that preambles to statutes, and accordingly, the Preamble to
the Constitution, are "a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be
remedied, and the objects, which arc to be accomplished by the provisions"); see also G.W.F.
MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 344, 363-64 (Bos., Saxton
& Peirce 1841) (asserting that "judges of the courts of New York and Pennsylvania referred directly
to the preamble of the Constitution as the basis on which the government was to be founded" and
providing an example of this occurring).
136. Some state constitutions of the Revolutionary Era also contained preambles asserting that
the social contract required government to protect society, individual rights, and to provide for
safety and happiness. A well-known example of a preamble stating that representative government
is developed to protect people's equal, natural rights is that of the 1776 Constitution of Virginia:
A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia,

assembled in full and free convention; which rights do pertain to them and their
posterity, as the basis and foundation of government.
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not confer specific powers, as Justice Joseph Story wrote in his commentary
to the Constitution, statesmen and jurists referred to the Preamble when
interpreting the Constitution. 37 Professor Charles Black pointed out that the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble are "[t]he two best sources"
for "striving toward rational consistency, . . . keeping the rules of legal
decision in tune with the society's structures and relationships, . . . [and]

SECTION 1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
SEC. 2. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that
magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.
VA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights §§ 1-2, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va1776.htm. Another example is the Preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which
continues to be in force today, declaring:
The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government, is to secure
the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who
compose it with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural rights, and
the blessings of life: and whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people have
a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety,
prosperity and happiness.
MASS. CONST. pmbl. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 contained a closely related preamble
tying government to the promotion of welfare by the protection of individual rights:
WHEREAS all government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and
protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it to
enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the Author of existence has
bestowed upon man; and whenever these great ends of government are not obtained,
the people have a right, by common consent to change it, and take such measures as to
them may appear necessary to promote their safety and happiness.
PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl., available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/pa08.asp. While
the wording of the Preamble to the Vermont Constitution of 1777 was not identical, it is
conceptually alike in its regard for rights and the general welfare:
WHEREAS, all government ought to be instituted and supported, for the security and
protection of the community, as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to
enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the Author of existence has
bestowed upon man; and whenever those great ends of government are not obtained,
the people have a right, by common consent, to change it, and take such measures as to
them may appear necessary to promote their safety and happiness.
VT. CONST. of 1777, pmbl., available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/vt01.asp. In
addition, the Maryland Constitution of 1776's first paragraph condemns Great Britain, and the
second paragraph introduces the structure of state government in these words, "That all government
of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of
the whole." MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. I, availableat http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/17thcentury/ma02.asp. Like the U.S. Constitution's Preamble, Maryland's preamble commits
government to follow the people's will to secure the common good. North Carolina's vested power
in the people at the beginning of its Declaration of Rights. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, art. I,availableat http://avalon.law.yale.edull 8th century/nc07.asp.
137. See 1 STORY, supra note 135, at § 460 ("There does not seem any reason why, in a ...
constitution ... , an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in
the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to by statesmen and
jurists to aid them in [interpretation].").
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reaching toward higher goals."'
Along the same lines, Professor Mark
Tushnet has stated, "The Declaration and the Preamble provide the
substantive criteria for identifying the people's vital interests."139 To
elaborate on the significance of national consistency in substantive criteria,
Charles Black posited that even without a First and Fourteenth Amendment it
is not fathomable to think a law prohibiting the public from discussing
political candidates for Congress could be remotely valid, given the
importance of public communication to our "national government."l 40 The
Declaration and the Preamble are at the root of the written Constitution's
meaning, and their core directive is for government to secure equal rights for
the common good.
Similar to my earlier examination of the Declaration's directive, a
historical analysis of the Preamble to the Constitution is critical to
understanding the governing principles of U.S. constitutionalism. History,
however, is the starting point. If it were the end point of analysis, Americans
would surely benefit from the wisdom of the Framers but also be burdened
by their narrow-mindedness.
The Preamble establishes that government must make an effort to
advance general welfare by eschewing the racism, ethnocentrism, and sexism
of the past. The framing generation failed to fully exercise the implicit
values of the Preamble's promise to "secure the Blessings of Liberty."' 4'
Racialism is only the most glaring example of its shortsightedness and
outright hypocrisy. Northern states ended slavery,142 but on a national level
the Founders made no constitutional or statutory effort to abolish the
institution.143 Many, indeed, viewed the Constitution as a license for slavery
because of its Three-Fifths, Fugitive Slave, and Importation Clauses. On the
other hand, John Parrish, a Maryland antislavery advocate, asserted that it
would be "ignoble" and "below the dignity" of politicians to define the

138. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND
POLICY INQUEST OF LAW 187, 192 (Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985).
139. TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 13; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 28 (2008) ("The Preamble states the
purposes of the instrument, or rather of the decision to make the instrument law, in terms most of
which seem oriented toward human good broadly conceived rather than toward institutional goals
narrowly defined."); Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the ConstitutionalSubject, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1049, 1053-54 (1995) ("[W]hen placed in its proper historic setting, 'We The People,' far
from expressing a genuine unity, actually embodies a stark contradiction. The meaning of 'We The
People' in the Preamble to the 1787 Constitution cannot be grasped without reference to the
proposition that 'all men are created equal' .... ").
140. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4243 (1969).
141. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. pmbl.
142. TSESIS, supranote 6, at 31-33.
143. See James P. Parke, Review of 'Memoirs of the Life of Anthony Benezet,' 6 CHRISTIAN
DISCIPLE 65, 69 (1818) ("[W]e formed a Constitution 'to promote the general welfare and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity;' but in which we also took care to hold in
absolute slavery ...

!" (emphasis omitted)).
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Preamble as a license for states to persist in slavery.144 He believed that the
Preamble should be understood within the context of the Declaration of
Independence's proclamation "'that all
have an unalienable right to life,
45
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'l
The Preamble begins by announcing that the people at large, not the
states, ordained the creation of the Constitution. 14 6 It thereby reestablishes
the directive of the Declaration that government's primary obligation is to the
people. All legitimate uses of power derive from their original grant of
authority, not beyond it. Anti-Federalists, who were opposed to ratification
of the Constitution, warned that the Preamble's use of "We the People"
rather than "We the States" demonstrated the plan to establish "a compact
between individuals entering into society, and not between separate
States."l 4 7 For those disposed against stronger national government than
existed under the Continental Congress, there was indeed much to be
concerned about because the Constitution expressly failed to use wording
comparable to the Articles of Confederation, which had explicitly reserved
state sovereign independence.14 8
This omission indicates a greater
centralization of power, social norms, and structural provisions. Only with
the ratification of the Tenth Amendment would the states' retained, reserved
powers be mentioned, and even then unspecifically and only in the context of
national authority.14 9
The Anti-Federalists and Federalists did agree that the Preamble was
meant to be a statement that the people would retain their natural rights in the
newly formed republic, but many Anti-Federalists thought the original
Constitution was insufficient for safeguarding those rights.'" Opponents of

144. JOHN PARRISH, REMARKS ON THE SLAVERY OF THE BLACK PEOPLE 8 (Phila., Kimber,

Conrad & Co. 1806).
145. Id at 8-9.
146. U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this
Constitution . . . ." (emphasis added)).
147. Philadelphia,December 8, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Jan. 3, 1788, at 1
(emphasis omitted).
148. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II ("Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."); State Convention,
SALEM MERCURY, Feb. 5, 1788, at I (describing an effort to include an addendum into the
Constitution explicitly asserting the continued independence of the states); The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, to Their
Constituents, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Jan. 26, 1788, at 1 (asserting an anti-federalist
complaint at the omission of state independence).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
150. State Convention, PA. HERALD & GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Dec. 8, 1787, at 2 (providing
a transcript of ratification debate arguments concerning the sufficiency and insufficiency of the
Preamble to protect natural rights, including a claim that the Declaration better protects rights than
the Preamble); A True Friend, To the Advocates for the New Federal Constitution, and to Their
Antagonists, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Dec. 22, 1787, at 2 (pressing for adding a new preamble
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ratification warned that the federal government's power to "provide for the
common defence [and] promote the general Welfare" 5 1 might allow the
nation to negatively impact "the personal rights of the citizens of the states,
and put their lives in jeopardy." 5 2 Naysayers were unable to prevent its
ratification. In response to the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution's supporters
defended the power of Congress to "promote the general Welfare" through
national legislation arguing that states were just as prone to corruption as the
federal government.' 5 3 Alexander Hamilton, in FederalistNo. 84, wrote that
the Preamble's assertion that "'We the people of the United States"'
established a federal government "'to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity"' should be understood to be a "recognition of
popular rights."' 5 4 With this assurance, Hamilton continued, no "minute
detail of particular rights" was needed because the people never gave up their
rights through the Constitution, but only meant the instrument to "regulate
the general political interests of the nation."155 Better to give power to the
wisest of the nation, so another author argued, to set unified policies for the
whole.15 6 The first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, gave more
express content to the Preamble's protection of rights for the promotion of
the general welfare. 5 7
The Preamble established the object of national governance to be the
welfare of the people of the United States. 58 The creation of the national

to the Constitution, which would enumerate rights). It was precisely the broad power to "promote
the general Welfare" without any limiting bill of rights that concerned some of the Constitution's
opponents. One opponent of ratification raised the concern in these terms:
To judge of what may be for the general welfare, and such judgments when made, the
acts of congress become supreme laws of the land. This seems a power co-extensive
with every possible object of human legislation. Yet there is no restraint in form of a
bill of rights, to secure ... that residuum of human rights, which is not intended to be
given up to society, and which indeed is not necessary to be given for any good social
purpose.
Miscellany: From the Virginia Gazette: Copy of a Letter from the Hon. Richard Henry Lee, Esq.,
one of the Delegates from This State in Congress, to his Excellency the Governor, Oct. 16, 1787,
N.Y. J. & DALY PATRIOTIC REG., Dec. 22, 1787, at 2.
151. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
152. Speech of John Williams, in THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, ASSEMBLED AT POUGHKEEPSIE, ON THE 17TH JUNE, 1788, at 91
(N.Y.C., Francis Childs 1788), availableat http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat-ny.htm.
153. M'Kean, FederalConstitution, SALEM MERCURY, Jan. 15, 1788, at 1.
154. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 512 (emphasis omitted).
155. Id.
156. M'Kean,supra note 153.
157. See To the Public, PHILA. GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1794, at 1 ("THE PEOPLE, whose rights are
protected, will be the friends and supporters of a Constitution established by themselves, for the
express purpose of promoting the 'General Welfare."').
158. Poplicola, For the Herald of Freedom, HERALD FREEDOM, & FED. ADVERTISER (Bos.),
Aug. 18, 1789, at 178 ("[T]he present national government is the people's government: that from
them it originated . . . for the great and beneficial purposes expressed in the preamble to the
constitution. Every lodgment of power, every relinquishment of natural right, . . . has the welfare of
the people of the United States for its ultimate object .... ).
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community, as lexicographer Noah Webster explained in a tract, meant for
"government to be established to secure to individuals their natural rights,
their liberty and property."159 The integration Webster saw of individuals
and the community as a whole is an example of the commonly held view that
public policy should protect the right to achieve private benefits for the

common good. 160
Standing on their own, the Preamble's statements on the overall purpose
of government were insufficient for governance. The remainder of the
Constitution gave content to the people's will to form a union for the general
welfare and common defense, where just governance would facilitate the
enjoyment of individual liberty. The Constitution likewise set a structure for
the governed to enjoy their inalienable rights of life and liberty in safety and
happiness. Together the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble
asserted the purpose of national government: The protection of inalienable
rights for the general welfare became the social ideal for both the founding
and subsequent generations. Like its earlier counterpart, more specific
clauses of the Constitution detailed how the three branches of government
were to achieve the Preamble's asserted aims. Specific clauses of the
Constitution, in turn, were themselves only starting points for developing the
statutes, precedents, and executive orders necessary for fleshing out the
contours of federal government.
One structural protection of these rights, as James Madison wrote, was
"the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments
ought to be separate and distinct."1 6 1 This was not an abstract commitment
but an "essential precaution in favor of liberty."' 62 Madison made this
statement at a time when he had not fully agreed to the addition of a bill of
rights, of which he would eventually become the chief architect. Needed
instead, he believed, were strong checks and balances capable of restraining

159. Noah Webster, Jun., A Letter to the President of the United States, in MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS, ON POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL SUBJECTS 33, 34 (N.Y.C., E. Belden & Co. 1802).
160. See, e.g., NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 116-17

(Rutland, J. Lyon 1793) (arguing that humans are social beings who agree to constitutional
governance for the common good to protect their rights).
161. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 297; see also Politics: From
the NEW YORK EVENING POST, An Examination of the President's Message, Continued (Phila.),

Mar. 20, 1802, at 85, reprintedin 2 PORT FOLIO 85 (Oliver Oldschool ed., Phila., H. Maxwell 1802)
("It is a fundamental maxim of free government, that the three great departments of power,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, shall be essentially distinct and independent the one of the
other."). Madison recognized that the separation of powers requires checks and balances among the
three branches of government. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 305
("[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free
government, can never in practice be duly maintained.").
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 297-98; see also James
Madison, The Letters of Helvidius, No. II, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN
JAY, THE FEDERALIST ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION app., at 482 (Hallowell, Glazier, Masters & Co.

1831) (discussing the maxim of the separation of powers).
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the will of tyrannical majorities.163 The structural solution combined the
need for efficient governance with the "intrinsic value" of preserving innate
liberty. 164 The institutional processes of lawmaking, enforcement, and
adjudication were tied to the protection of inalienable rights.
C.

Maxim Constitutionalism

Fair administration of the three branches of government, exercising their
separate powers in accordance with impartial social rules, is only one aspect
of unwritten constitutionalism16 5 subject to the overarching purposes of the
maxim constitutionalism adopted in the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble. 166 Both of these documents, I suggest, describe representative
governance committed to the protection of justice and furtherance of the
common good, which constitute the object of U.S. constitutional law. That
objective derives from the people's collective will to be governed according
to laws that protect their fundamental rights and further public well-being in
a manner that benefits the common interests of the populace. However, the
Declaration's and the Preamble's statements of national purpose, neither of
which contained any specific enumeration of powers, were too nebulous for
effectuating the maxim of constitutional purpose; the ethos of governance did
not by itself give any indications of who was to promulgate laws, execute
them, and adjudicate legal conflicts.
The Constitution supplied the
administrative details missing from the Declaration and the Preamble. The
combination of a workable structure and a national purpose served to create a
functioning government, albeit one that each generation would need to
interpret to achieve the central goal of protecting rights for the common
good.
In his dissent to Poe v. Ullman,167 justice John Harlan spoke of the dual
ethical aspects of U.S. constitutionalism: "[T]he balance which our Nation,

163. Jack N. Rakove, ParchmentBarriersand the Politics ofRights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW-1791 AND 1991, at 98, 134 (Michael J.
Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991) (listing Madison's ultimately abandoned proposals for
curbing majoritarian abuses).
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 297-98.
165. See Richard A. Paschal, Congressional Power to Change Constitutional Law: Three
Lacunae, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1053, 1108 (2009) ("[Olne of the most prominent examples of an
unwritten structural principle in American constitutionalism is the separation of powers.");
Garrick B. Pursley, FederalismCompatibilists, 89 TEXAS L. REv. 1365, 1387 (2011) (book review)
("[T]he Constitution's broad structural norms entrenching the separation of powers and federalism
are not communicated directly by any single textual provision.").
166. See BILL WHITEHOUSE, REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION AND LEARNING 25 (2009) ("The
separation of powers among the Executive Branch, the Legislature, and the Judiciary was intended
as a system of procedural checks and balances to protect the integrity of the principles and purposes
inherent in the Preamble."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciabilityand Separation of Powers: A NeoFederalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 407 & n.67 (1996) (providing examples of
provisions in "the Declaration of Independence [that] condemned England's tyrannical violation of
separation of powers").

167. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society."l 68 Harlan
located this balance between individual and social rights in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 9 whose source I believe should be
traced even further back to the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution. In a different opinion, the Court struck down a
racist municipal ordinance against Chinese immigrants, quoting a portion of
the Declaration of Independence and placing its statement of rights in the
context of constitutional society: "[F]undamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws .... ."170 The penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, on which Justice William 0. Douglas pinned the right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut,171 and the unenumerated rights, on which Justice
Goldberg relied in his concurrence to that case,172 are based on interests
retained by the people and their limited grant of governmental authority.!73
This balance of public and private interests is both a semantic part of the
Constitution and one that the Court should aim to achieve in constructing
(that is, applying) the Constitution to specific cases; any distinction between
interpretation and construction on the matter of highest constitutional
importance is artificial when it comes to the judicial obligation to protect
fundamental rights and to balance individual interests with public policy,
safeguarding the good of the whole.17 4 All judges are products of their own
time, and none can be sure of the original semantic meaning of any clause of
the Constitution. All that can be done is fair and just application of specific
clauses on the basis of legislative intent or countermajoritarian
construction.'75 However, significant deviation from the underlying purpose
of national union, which requires public actors to protect individuals for the
benefit of the common good, violates the organizing principle to which the
168. Id at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 540, 543.

170. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 374 (1886).
171. 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
172. Id at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 486-88 ("[T]he Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.").
174. For a definitional distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional
construction see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

65, 66 (2011) ("Interpretation is the activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use
of language in context. Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to particular factual
circumstances."). More convincing than this differentiation, which tends to separate a joined effort
of applying textual semantics, is John Hart Ely's distinction between "interpretivism" and
"noninterpretivism." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 1 (1980).
175. See infra subpart III(A).
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people pledged their lives, fortunes, and honor.'76 Antidiscrimination laws
are built on the predicate that the protection of individual rights is essential to
social life. As Justice Kennedy explained in a case finding unconstitutional a
majoritarian initiative against antihomophobic regulations, a state's interest
in its citizens' well-being is meant to protect "an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society." 7 The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the
Constitution jointly announce that the people have granted power to public
servants for the purpose of furthering general welfare through a
representative government whose aim is to safeguard inalienable rights in
order to facilitate the equal pursuit of happiness. Together they compose a
statement of secular morality, stated in terms of reciprocal demands and
obligations needed for a pluralistic society each of whose members has a
unique vision of what constitutes the good life. They do not create the right
to freedom and well-being, to which all humans are entitled by birth, but
formally adopt it as the core obligation of federal government. The
Declaration's reference to "unalienable Rights"' 78 takes for granted that
people retain human dignity and create a representative government to
protect those entitlements. The Preamble's General Welfare Clause expands
on statements in the Declaration predicating the need for government to
protect the public good. 79
A constitutional maxim relevant to any representative democracy that is
committed to citizens' equality must respect different, often contradictory,
religions, aesthetics, and practices. This is a universal predicate of all
representative democracies, with the Declaration and the Preamble providing
the people's binding decision to institute it in the United States. Any nation
committing itself to representing the interests of all its people-not merely a
few, as is the case with plutocracies, autocracies, tyrannies, and
aristocracies-on a procedurally equal basis must create a structure of
governance with the power to protect and further interests likely to achieve
the public good. Representational democracy enables ordinary constituents
to participate in voting and lobbying for change. Law must reflect mutually
respectful and accommodating social attitudes that only resort to coercion,
through criminal and civil penalties, when the agent commits intentional or
negligent harms. The maxim of freedom and general welfare has remained
stable, thanks in no small part to its codification in the Declaration and the
Preamble, but generations have grappled with its meaning and the nation's
failure to live up to its stated ideals. Americans have come to the point in

176. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) ("And for the support of this

Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.").
177. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
178. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

179. See id.
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their history where much of the public recognizes morally, religiously, and
ethnically diverse people's correlative right to live a satisfying life in a
politically engaged society that tolerates secular and religious education,180
male and female aspirations 8 1 and sexual practices, 182 and a host of other
interests necessary for self-fulfillment, even though they are not explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution.
A central principle of moral governance interlinks a wide community of
equals. A society committed to benefitting individuals for the common good
is inherently tolerant, pluralistic, and respectful of human beings. Any other
policy is contradictory of maxim constitutionalism because it would deny the
rights of individuals and thereby decrease the general welfare. The rights
that maxim constitutionalism protects are generic-such as liberty and wellbeing-and belong to everyone equally by their very humanity, as volitional
beings seeking goods and benefits.' 83 Government's obligation in such a
social environment is to account for and respond to the interests of everyone
as they are expressed through constitutionally predictable structures for
The
assimilating collective wisdom into nondiscriminatory laws.
representative process is meant to give practical effect to the people's will.
In the United States, general statements about norms, such as freedom
of speech and religion or the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, are integrated into the Constitution's structural provisions, such as
those limiting executive, legislative, or judicial powers.184 People are more
likely to subject themselves to authority when they have accurate reason
(based on past practices and policy statements) to believe that political power
will be used to safeguard their fundamental liberties on an equal footing with
similarly situated persons. 8 1 One seeks to contribute to social success where
180. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (holding that parents have the
right to choose whether to send their children to public or parochial school).
181. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (finding the Equal Protection
Clause applicable to gender classification of a military education institution).
182. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the Due Process Clause
protects sexual privacy).
183. The public position I am adopting is closely related to Alan Gewirth's private Principle of
Generic Consistency: "Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of

yourself" GEWIRTH, supra note 23. This precept requires "action in accord with the recipients'
generic rights of freedom and of well-being," which Gewirth calls "genericrules." Id.
184. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005,
1023 (2011) ("The Bill of Rights is centrally concerned with allocation and separation of
powers. . . ."); id at 1039-40 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is fundamentally a limit on
executive power). See also Rosenkranz, supra note 29, at 1252-53 (arguing that the First
Amendment is expressly a limit on congressional power).
185. See Luis E. Chiesa, Outsiders Looking In: The American Legal Discourse of Exclusion, 5

RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 309 (2008) ("[Olbedience to authorities and cooperation with the
government decreases as the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement agencies diminishes."); Erik
Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1161 (2000) ("A legitimate form of
government receives obedience not for its policy choices, the charisma of its leaders, or the
internalized moral values of a given individual; rather, government decisions are deferred to and its
commands obeyed because the State has the 'right' to demand compliance.").
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she and those close to her stand to benefit from the protection of laws that
place just limits on their personal choices without interfering with the core
right of free personal development. For instance, the right to compulsory
public education places limitations on those parents who would prefer to
keep their children home, but society limits familial choice in this regard
because the state's functions include the protection of minors' eventual
ability to function outside the home after reaching the age of majority. 186In
order to enjoy their liberties on an equal footing with others, some amount of
education must be compulsory to enable children to pursue public and
personal goals. Put in general terms, the majority in Plyler v. Doe187
recognized that "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society."18 8 (The Court's later
assertion that public education is not a constitutional value, 189 therefore,
deflates its earlier pronouncement on the role of schooling as an individual
right essential in a polity committed to public good.190)
Maxim
constitutionalism is a value in many other opinions. The legitimacy of
seminal decisions like Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,191
Tennessee v. Lane,' 92 and National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,193 and of footnote four of UnitedStates v. CaroleneProducts Co.194
does not rest on the composition of the political majority, nor even on the
specific constitutional clauses Congress relied upon to pass laws, but on the
extent to which the upheld legislation protected individual rights and
advanced general welfare. This is not an ends-justifies-the-means argument;
instead, it requires policymakers to rely on the directive of constitutional

186. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
187. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
188. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
189. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.").
190. Id. at 110-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society." (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even as
the majority in Rodriguez rejected the claim that education is a constitutional right, it admitted that
"'the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be doubted."
Id. at 30 (majority opinion) (quoting Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280,
283 (W.D. Tex. 1971)).
191. 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (holding that Title II was an appropriate exercise of the
commerce power when applied to a public accommodation serving interstate travelers).
192. 541 U.S. 509, 524-29 (2004) (upholding Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section Five
authority to pass Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which created a private cause of
action against states for disability discrimination).
193. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-96, 2600 (2012) (finding that the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act's mandate to buy health insurance or pay a tax penalty is within Congress's taxing power).
194. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in cases
involving interference with the political process and discrimination against "discrete and insular
minorities").

2013]

Maxim Constitutionalism

1647

governance set down in the Preamble and Declaration to rely on specific
constitutional clauses to exercise their separate powers and to act for social
betterment while not violating the people's intrinsic rights.
This exercise of authority is the procedurally neutral means of seeking
to fulfill the ideal running through the normative and structural parts of the
Constitution: Protection of liberties as the only legitimate means of
advancing the common good.19 5 I call this ideal of representative governance
"maxim constitutionalism." It prohibits the exploitation of any person or
group of persons to benefit some other corporate or natural party. It is the
foundational standard of constitutionalism, which sets that baseline norm
against which all statutes, judicial rules, and executive orders must be
evaluated. I believe that the underlying purpose of unified government is the
protection of individual rights to secure the public good. Put in the negative,
where individuals are denied the ability to exercise their correlative right to
equal liberty, the common good suffers at least by the diminished happiness
of those who are negatively affected by the injustice. The general directive
of governance combines the inalienable-rights statement of the Declaration
of Independence and the general-welfare statement of the Preamble to the
Constitution into a unified norm of national purpose: The protection of rights
for the public benefit. This norm plays a legitimizing function, providing a
universal principle for public debates about refining or altogether abolishing
past legal practices. 196 The ultimate purpose of representative governance
plays a justificatory role necessary for evaluating what Joseph Raz has called
"non-ultimate goods."' 9 7 The existence of a central norm disciplines
interpretation of the Constitution, the enactment of law, and the exercise of
executive authority.
A maxim that is suitable for constitutional governance must be elegant,
pithy, and general. Elegance is needed to capture the attention of ordinary
people, who might otherwise find the subject too dull, turgid, and esoteric.
Brevity is requisite for collective memorization, which becomes
unsustainable as the maxim becomes too lengthy. Finally, generality is

195. Alasdair Macintyre, to the contrary, believes that constitutional decision making should
neither try to invoke presumed "shared moral first principles" nor try to create them. ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY INMORAL THEORY 253 (3d ed. 2007). For a refutation of
MacIntyre, see POWELL, supra note 139, at 103-16.
196. My approach rejects a nihilistic perspective and adopts an objective understanding of
constitutional interpretation. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV.
739, 744 (1982) ("Objectivity in the law connotes standards. It implies that an interpretation can be
measured against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point of the person offering
the interpretation."); see also id. at 762-63 (arguing against a nihilistic interpretation of the
Constitution that would drain it of meaning); THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 5, at 27 (asserting that the "public good" is the "true interest[]" of choosing whether to adopt
the Constitution).
197. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 200 (1986) ("The relation of ultimate values to
intrinsic values which are not ultimate is an explanatory or justificatory one. Ultimate values are
referred to in explaining the value of non-ultimate goods.").
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essential for consistent dealing with a plethora of disputes; developing a
variety of principles, rules, and regulations stemming from the
constitutionally granted authority to the three branches of government; and
finding consensus in a common-sense public morality that does not
deteriorate into a democratic tyranny targeting minorities and otherwise
disempowered persons.
As Mark Tushnet pointed out, "[t]he Declaration's principles define our
fundamental law."l 9 8 He further drew attention to how these "principles"
should rest on the Declaration and the Preamble, which together obligate "the
people of the United States .

..

[to realize] universal human rights."'"

Both

the Declaration and the Preamble imply that persons are volitional agents
who willingly participate in representative government to achieve a
collective purpose. That collective purpose is the protection of the human
entitlement to strive for self-fulfillment. The statement "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" provides a reference point for identifying the
inalienable rights of people and then holding government accountable for
their protection.
The intersection between the Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution is evident through a number of their passages.
The "Pursuit of Happiness,, 200 described in the former should be understood
as well-being, and the Preamble's use of "general Welfare" makes the federal
government responsible for its promotion through official measures. 2 0 1 The
latter provision is also tied to the Declaration's mandate to institute a
government that is "most likely to effect" the people's "Safety and
Happiness." 202 The Declaration speaks in clear terms on the innate nature of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that is relevant to understanding the
Preamble's stated goal of laying out a constitutional order capable of

198. TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 14.

199. Id at 51, 53.
200. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

201. Justice Louis D. Brandeis's dissent in an overruled case nicely merges the Declaration's
recognition of human aspirations with the constitutional grants of authority:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
202. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration's second
paragraph provides:
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its

Foundation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Id.
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securing liberty.203 Independent states are described as having the "Power to
levy War, conclude Peace, [and] contract Alliances" in the Declaration.20
While the Preamble states that the national government is formed in part to
"provide for the common defence,"20 5 the meaning does not differ from its
predecessor. A portion of the Declaration of Independence condemns the
British monarch because "[h]e has refused his Assent to Laws, the most
wholesome and necessary for the public Good." 2 06 The implication is that
the people have a right to make laws for the public good, and the Preamble
echoes that sentiment by asserting that the people formed the federal
government to "promote the general Welfare."207
The documents
complement each other, with the Preamble being the segue to the written
Constitution from the Declaration's promises of liberal equality.
The general statements found in the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble cannot provide concrete answers about the specific
responsibilities allotted severally to the three branches of government.
Pregnant terms like safety, happiness, general welfare, liberty, and equality
have always required elaboration.2 08 Without legal detail these broad terms
can mean different things to various interest groups who can seek to
manipulate them for mere rhetorical effect. 20 9 What's more, these social
concepts lack the requisite prioritization needed to resolve the inevitable
conflicts of pluralistic society.210 This is not to say that they do not place
imperative obligations on government actors and institutions but that the
details must be fleshed out in accordance with some central maxim that must
guide state actors to formulate policy, choose between differing courses of
action, and enforce enacted decisions.
The significance of government deriving its power from the people, for
instance, clearly requires the administration of representative government.
While "the people" is an abstract construct for representative governance, not
necessarily tied to a specific generation of Americans but to the ideal of an

203. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (asserting the people's decision to develop a constitution "in Order to

form a more perfect Union ... and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity").
204. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
205. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
206. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
207. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
208. Cf RAZ, supra note 197, at 91 (discussing how "various attitudes towards society ... can
all be regarded as so many variations on a basic attitude of identification with the society, an
attitude of belonging and of sharing in its collective life").
209. Cf John Hayakawa Torok, Freedom Now!-Race Consciousness and the Work of De-

Colonization Today, 48 HOW. L.J. 351, 394 n.277 (2004) (recalling that Fidel Castro used the
Declaration of Independence in his own legal defense and noting the power of "invoking the
American Revolution for rhetorical effect, while redefining its meaning").
210. See Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: The
Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585, 592 (2005) (stating that while constitutions

"proclaim all the values their framers believe essential to a good society," they do not prioritize
those values, leaving that job to "implementers and interpreters").
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engaged political community, what is clear is that government institutions
were created for their benefit.
That end is furthered through the
administration of laws prohibiting certain government conduct, such as
intrusion into bodily integrity, 211 and enabling other action, such as the
22
distribution of vaccinations,212
and the provision of social security benefits213
214
and affordable health care.
The details of such negative and proscriptive
laws are worked out through political debates, judicial deliberation, and
executive enforcement.215
The sovereignty of the people is announced in the Constitution even
before the functions of the three branches of government are enumerated.216
The separation of powers, therefore, is a structure of governance for
exercising public functions for the betterment of the population as a whole.
Where any branch-be it legislative, executive, or judicial-acts solely to
compound its authority or to augment the aggrandizement of its
officeholders, the real interest of constitutional self-governance, which is the
protection of the people's interests for the betterment of the whole, is
violated. Officials who seek their personal interests or who overreach into
the province of the other two coequal branches of government engage in the
type of autocracy that the statements of independence and constitutional
norms enjoin.
Binding details on the exercise of power are necessary because an
overgeneralized maxim of liberal equality would allow for radically
subjective decision making. The Declaration of Independence and the
Preamble to the Constitution assert nationally recognized norms to which
citizens can refer in order to examine the legitimacy of government conduct.
The conversation of constitutional law-in which ordinary citizens and
government officials participate-requires a clearly organized principle to
provide for a common structure. This structure allows like-minded as well as
adversarial parties to understand each others' meanings, no matter how

211. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (reaffirming the "well-established,
traditional rights to bodily integrity").
212. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-29, 38-39 (1905) (upholding the
constitutionality of wide-scale vaccination).
213. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634-36, 640-41 (1937) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Social Security Act).
214. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (finding the
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act to be constitutional).
215. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act presents an example of this process. See
id. (ruling on the constitutionality of the law); Sarah Kliff, For Obamacare, Four More (Uncertain)
Years, woNKBLOG, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/2 1/for-obamacare-four-more-uncertain-years/
(describing
the
Executive-centered process of implementing the law); Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care
Law, CNN (June 17, 2012, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/17/politics/health-caretimeline (recounting the long legislative road to passing the law).
216. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (setting forth at the outset that "[w]e the People" establish the
Constitution and therefore possess sovereign authority).
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different their backgrounds or perspectives.217 A unified maxim defining
national norms establishes a term of reference for all public conduct. Clauses
of the Constitution flesh out the specifics set out more broadly in the
Declaration's and the Preamble's statements of legitimacy.
Yet, particular clauses of the Constitution are subordinate to the single
most important purpose of governance, the protection of rights for the
common good. A universal maxim provides a determinate basis for
governance while allowing divergent interpretations to play themselves out
in litigation and legislative policy. Given the racialist and sexist lenses of
constitutional construction of the framing generation, some principle was
needed for future change, and, yet, that change could not be made without
reference to the history and progressive trajectory of the nation. 2 18 Even a
comprehensive directive for the exercise of authority is useless unless it
informs practical judgment, and an independent decision maker without a
fixed aspiration is blown about by the whims of present circumstances. As
the philosopher Richard Hare wittily put it,
It would be foolish, in teaching someone to drive, to try and inculcate
into him such fixed and comprehensive principles that he would never
have to make an independent decision. It would be equally foolish to
go to the other extreme and leave it to him to find his own way of
driving. 2 19
Professor Lawrence Lessig makes a similar point, asserting that legal
interpretation requires fidelity to founding principles in the context of
contemporary circumstances unforeseen in the founding era. 2 20 A basis of
authority is essential for consistency, predictability, and reliability, but so too
is independent judgment about how to apply it.
Where specific clauses of the Constitution fail to achieve this ultimate
purpose-as was the case with the Three-Fifths, 2 2 1 Fugitive Slave, 2 22 and
Importation Clauses 223-the people can use the amendment process to correct
deficiencies and guarantee norms. First, the Bill of Rights enumerated some

217. H.P. Grice has characterized the process through which participants in a communication,
such as a dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution or about a mundane subject, agree to
H.P. Grice, Logic and
advance the conversation along a mutually accepted trajectory.
Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan
eds., 1975).
218. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 249-55 (affirming the Fifth
Amendment's role in desegregation and rejecting that succeeding generations are bound by the
"expected application of 1791," so long as the "proposed construction . . . makes the most sense of
the clause in the context of the larger constitutional plan").
219. R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 76 (1952).
220. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367-86
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 401-07,410-14 (1995).
221. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
222. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
223. Id art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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of the most important rights guaranteed by the blueprint of governance found
224
in the Declaration and the Preamble.22
None of the first ten Amendments,
however, guaranteed the right to vote or the protection of speech against
state, as opposed to federal, intrusion; more conspicuously, a nation founded
on the notion that everyone was born equal did not even mention equality,
which until ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment would remain a
constitutional ideal determinately stated only by the Declaration. The
Reconstruction Amendments were a correction to the injustice of inequality
that was endemic to the original Constitution. Many of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments' framers regarded them as reparative
of the initial Framers' failure to live up to the country's founding
principles. 22 5 The Nineteenth Amendment was likewise meant to correct a
deficiency of the original constitutional compac t226-a deficiency that
discounted the inalienable and political rights of half the adult population of
the United States-and helped steer the country in the direction of the
promises embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble.
Other Amendments, such as the Twelfth Amendment and Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, are more focused on the proper workings of government. But
they also warded off corruption, with the Twelfth Amendment designed to
prevent the intrigues that were corrosive to President John Adams's
administration 22 7 and the House run-off election that resulted in the election
of President Thomas Jefferson and the tainted vice presidency of Aaron

224. I develop this concept on the basis of Justice Brennan's idea that the original Constitution
provided the structure for government, and the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments
augmented the text to have a "sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity of every
individual" that fosters and protects "the freedom, the dignity, and the rights of all persons within
our borders." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEXAS L. REv. 433, 439-41 (1986).
225. See TSESIS, supra note 6, at 91-93, 99-109.
226. See Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102

YALE L.J. 2175, 2177-78 (1993) (stating that the "conceptual underpinnings" of the Nineteenth
Amendment were "not only . . . a means to improve women's lives, but also . . . symbolize[d]

recognition of women's equal personal rights and equal political privileges with all other citizens"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
227. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 60 (2008) (discussing how the

Twelfth Amendment altered presidential elections); Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's
Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 925, 931 n.23 (2001) ("The Framers of
the Twelfth Amendment obviously had the then-recent Adams-Jefferson administration to look
back on, and may have rejected [the runner-up] alternative for similar reasons.").
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Burr. 2 28 The Twenty-Seventh meant to prevent legislative corruption through
irregular compensation.2 29
Implicitly, the Amendment Clause of the Constitution 23 0 contains the
power to effectuate positive change for achieving social progress. But how
can we know whether society is progressing to the promise of liberty and the
common good? Progress is made for the people as a whole, not only for
some segments of society.231 Favoritism for only some classes of the
population, or for some individuals to the arbitrary exclusion of others,
neither protects the collective rights of the people nor is conducive to the
general welfare, which is a collective, not a balkanized, term. Balance and
context are requisite for each decision made by each of the three branches of
government. If the people disagree with the balance, they can elect new
politicians and press for the appointment of judges more true to maxim
constitutionalism and the Constitution as a whole.
The statement of national purpose found in the Declaration of
Independence presupposes that all humans have innate rights, and the
Preamble establishes one of the country's principal aims as the protection of
the general welfare. 2 32 Public policy must aim to further the common good
through institutions working to protect essential human entitlements. This,
no doubt, is a very broad directive of governance in need of much

228. See Richard Albert, The ConstitutionalPolitics ofPresidentialSuccession, 39 HOFSTRA L.

REv. 497, 573 (2011) ("[T]he Twelfth Amendment was a direct response to the electoral crisis that
erupted in the presidential election of 1800 pitting then-Vice President Thomas Jefferson against
Aaron Burr."); Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the United States Constitution:
Competing Narratives of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L.J. 1337, 1353 (2009)

("The Twelfth Amendment was added to the Constitution in the aftermath of the fiasco of 1800,
where Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied for first and Thomas Jefferson was chosen only two
days before inauguration on the thirty-sixth ballot.").
229. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the TwentySeventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 497, 502-08 (1992) (discussing the origin and the

development of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment and noting its purpose as a restraint on Congress's
ability to set its own wages).
230. U.S. CONST. art. V.
231. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (enumerating the purposes of the Constitution as including
promotion of the general welfare); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)

(recognizing the equality of all men and stating that governments are established to ensure the
unalienable rights of all).
232. The Declaration of Independence derives from a natural-rights theory that ties duties,
responsibilities, and entitlements to attributes that are intrinsic to human nature. See Eric R. Claeys,
Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85

NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1379, 1382 (2010) (discussing "American natural-rights morality" within the
context of "the theory of unalienable and natural rights set forth in the Declaration of
Independence"); Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49

Hous. L. REv. 393, 425 (2012) (mentioning the "Declaration of Independence['s] . . . grand
proclamation of natural rights"). Natural law philosophy ties norms to human characteristics. See
Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, 80

FORDHAM L. REv. 1997, 2023 (2012) ("Natural law norms are natural because they are tied to
human nature: they identify which actions are right and wrong by reference to a being with human
characteristics.").
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elaboration, but the same can be said of subordinate constitutional principles.
For instance, the general tenets of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses are clearly binding and supreme over any violative state action, but
their wording is indeterminate without the added specificity provided by
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions. The American constitutional
project, then, is an evolving process of identifying, developing, negotiating,
and working out reasonable policies likely to benefit private and public
interests.
The constitutional text is a necessary component of this
deliberative process,23 3 as is the aspirational directive to pursue justice and
equality. 234 The text does not, however, have a static meaning but is
malleable enough to react to collective wisdom through legislative debate,
judicial deliberation, and administrative regulation. 2 3 5 The anchor for
constitutional evolution this Article seeks to demonstrate is the maxim that
government must "promote the general [w]elfare" 2 36 through laws and
policies that the people, through their elected representatives, regard as "most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.",23 7 This is the framing standard
against which all other policies must be evaluated. Each generation of
Americans seeks to disambiguate this broad purpose of governance through
political debate, compromise, experimentation, and reconsideration.

233. The Supreme Court has often recognized that liberty claims can arise "from the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty,' or [they] may arise from
an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221
(2005) (citation omitted); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (finding that Congress is
implicitly prohibited from passing laws violative of the Constitution and from enabling states to
commit such violations); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (asserting that certain
judicial power was "perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was explicit in
another"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970) (concerning the due process required
before welfare entitlements are abridged).
234. The ambiguity of some of the most indeterminate portions of the Constitution led Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes to throw up his hands and declare that equal protection claims were "the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 208 (1927).
Refusing to parse fundamental rights and equal protection, Holmes countenanced popular prejudice
against black voters in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), and against the reproduction of the
allegedly mentally handicapped in Buck. See Giles, 189 U.S. at 486-88 (refusing to balance the
private interest to vote against the public interest of efficient administration of the franchise); Buck,
274 U.S. at 205-06 (presuming that "experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in
the transmission of insanity [and] imbecility"). Holmes's Social Darwinistic notion of popular
governance sought to legitimize the exercise of popularly passed laws even when they were meant
to further class prejudice and disregard the political will of disempowered individuals. Alexander
Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence:A HistoricalPerspective
on the Power ofHate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 729, 765-70 (2000). It was his skepticism

about broad principles of rights that also led Holmes to declare: "Although that Preamble indicates
the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never
been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United
States or on any of its Departments." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1, 22 (1905).
235. See Fiss, supra note 197, at 753-54 (defending a view that public morality is embodied in
the text of the Constitution and necessary for explaining why the Constitution should be obeyed).
236. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
237. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

2013]

Maxim Constitutionalism

1655

III. Theoretical Context
The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution
declared the people to be sovereign and set normative limits on the
administration of government.238 The central purpose of governance, to
safeguard the people's rights on an equal basis for the betterment of society,
is the duty of all three branches of government. Constitutional interpretation
should play a role in exercising each of the Branches' respective functions.
Most theories of constitutional interpretation, nevertheless, focus almost
exclusively on various methodologies of judicial interpretation.239 This Part
of the Article analyzes three prominent theories of interpretation:
originalism, living constitutionalism, and proceduralism. I make no effort to
provide an exhaustive analysis of any of these three schools of thought. The
discussion of maxim constitutionalism in the context of other interpretative
methods is rather meant to examine whether there is any advantage to relying
on a central constitutional ethos of national purpose. This Part of the Article
concludes with an analysis of whether a process-based understanding of the
Constitution is sufficiently robust to formulate civil rights policy.
A.

Originalism
In the last four decades, originalism has left a significant mark on
academic and judicial writings. 24 0 The stated aim of its supporters is for
judges to interpret the Constitution according to the Framers' initial meaning

238. See id; U.S. CONST. pmbl.
239. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 3 (2009) ("The initial problem

is that when Americans think of constitutional change, they focus on judicial interpretations, not on
the role of their elected representatives or of citizens themselves."); Larry D. Kramer, Judicial
Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 629 (2012) ("[T]he

assumption that legislatures are incapable of taking the Constitution seriously is, as Judge Posner's
treatment illustrates, even more taken for granted and less examined by legal scholars today than
judicial supremacy. It needs and deserves more serious treatment.").
Philip Bobbitt has identified the six legitimate modalities (i.e., forms) of constitutional
interpretation to be textual, historical, structural, prudential, ethical, and doctrinal arguments.
BOBBITT, supra note 128, at 11-22. By legitimate, Bobbitt refers to the grammatically correct
methods for courts to understand the Constitution. Id at 23. But for him, unlike me, legitimate
does not refer to any overarching constitutional ethos. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TExAS L. REv. 1771, 1775-76 (1994). Professors Balkin and
Levinson note:
The lay reader is apt to be confused by Bobbitt's use of "legitimacy," for there is an
almost irresistible temptation to impute a moral valence to something that is
"legitimate." However, Bobbitt insists that this temptation must be resisted, at least if
we want to understand how our constitutional grammar works.
Id.
240. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 3 (arguing that originalism and

living constitutionalism are compatible); Scalia, supra note 11, at 864 (analyzing nonoriginalism
and originalism and classifying himself as a "faint-hearted originalist"); Strang, supra note 233, at
2003-14, 2026-39 (discussing the history of originalism and its innate virtue); David A. Strauss,
Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1161, 1162 (2012) (challenging originalism as a way
of interpreting the Constitution).

1656

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

or intent. 2 4 1 This method is meant to prevent judges from rendering decisions
on the basis of political predispositions.242 Early originalists like Judge
Robert Bork argued that judicial restraint required judges to "stick close to
the text and the history, and their fair implications." 2 4 3 "[T]he only
legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking," Bork wrote, is "original
intent."244 For Bork and other early expositors of this schema, much of the
Warren Court's legacy was based on faulty reasoning rather than verifiable
"meaning attached by the framers to the words they employed in the
Constitution."245 Reagan Administration Attorney General Edwin Meese III
took this line of thought into the public sphere. Meese advocated a
"jurisprudence of original intention" requiring judges to consult "the original
intent of the Framers."246 Scholars, judges, and politicians who promoted the
intentionalist branch of originalism believed the Framers established
interpretive standards that they intended to be binding on their own and
future generations.247
Intentionalists' historical claims came under fire for being inferential,
driven by legal and political agenda, and often historically inaccurate. The
record of ratification conventions, Madison's notes of the Constitutional
Convention, and political pamphlets of the day are too inconsistent,
incomplete, and partisan to make incontrovertible or decisive conclusions
about their contribution to contemporary debates.24 8 Furthermore, the
Framers were not intellectually unified. Simply put, it is disingenuous to
241. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 7-9 (discussing the version of

originalism popularized by Justice Scalia, which uses the "original meaning" to interpret the
Constitution (citing Scalia, supra note 11, at 862-64)).
242. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,

122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 195 (2008) ("Justice Scalia has long advocated originalism on the grounds
that it constrains judicial discretion and so enables judges to enforce the Constitution as law, not
politics."); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 246, 248 (2008) (stating that Justice Scalia's "interest in originalism is explicitly connected
with his interest in rule-bound law and in constraining judicial discretion; on his account,
originalism is uniquely capable of ensuring that constitutional law is not a matter of judicial will or
ad hoc, case-by-case judgments").
243. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,

8(1971).
244. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L.

REV. 823, 823 (1986).
245. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 108 & n.71, 402 (2d ed. 1997).

246. The Hon. Edwin Meese III, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., Address before the D.C. Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division at the Golden Palace 8, 10, 12-13 (Nov. 15, 1985), availableat
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/meese/l985/11-15-1985.pdf. Concerning the importance that
Meese's public adoption of originalism played in the growth of this intellectual movement, see Ian
Bartrum, OriginalistIdeology and the Rule ofLaw, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 1, 1-

2 (2012).
247. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.

REV. 885, 886 (1985) (distinguishing the intentionalist branch of originalism).
248. See Frank B. Cross, Originalism-The Forgotten Years, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 46

(2012) (discussing the incompleteness of the historical record of the constitutional period).

2013]

Maxim Constitutionalism

1657

ascribe a collective conscience to individuals as disparate in their views as
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. 2 49 While at the time of
ratification, the Early Republic only had one political party, the acrimonious
disputes between Federalists supporting the Constitution and Anti-Federalists
opposing it without changes to the Philadelphia Convention's formuli were
anything but unified.250 Sometimes there was overlap even among rivals,
which allowed Hamilton and Jefferson to work in the Washington
administration and Federalists to acquiesce to Anti-Federalists' demands for
a written bill of rights, but there were also profound differences of opinion,
such as Hamilton's preference for strong national government and
Jefferson's advocacy for local agronomic self-government, or the Federalists'
willingness to ratify the original Constitution with only implicit protections
of rights and the Anti-Federalists' condemnation of the omission of those
written guarantees. 25 1 Some of the most influential Framers' views evolved,
indeed morphed, after ratification. Jefferson, for instance, clearly changed
his view about the capacity of the United States to expand territorially
without constitutional amendment after France agreed to sell the Louisiana
Territory.2 52 James Madison initially argued against inclusion of a bill of
rights in the Constitution, fearing that it would be construed to only protect
enumerated rights and thereby leave other natural rights unprotected against
government intrusion.253 But he later served as the floor leader in the House
of RepresentativeS254 on behalf of adopting the Bill of Rights. 2 5 5 This

249. See NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM JR., JEFFERSON VS. HAMILTON: CONFRONTATIONS THAT
SHAPED A NATION (2000) (discussing their divergent views).
250. See, e.g., 1 FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989) (compiling writings by
some of the leading scholars and theorists of the eighteenth century to highlight the intense
constitutional debate among Federalists and Antifederalists); DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING THE
REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND FEDERALISTS INCONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2002) (confirming as
much).
251. See Powell, supra note 247, at 891 & n.31, 904-14 (detailing the hermeneutical views of
Federalists and their Anti-Federalist opponents).
252. HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 363-64 (Library of Am. ed., Penguin Books 1986)
(1889).
253. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., Univ. Press of Va.
1977) (conditioning any support for a bill of rights on whether "it be so framed as not to imply
powers not meant to be included in the enumeration" and noting the inefficacy of state bills of rights
in preventing government intrusion); Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 206-07 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., Univ.
Press of Va. 1979) (calling the enumeration argument "one of the most plausible arguments I have
ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system").
254. See Carey Roberts, James Madison in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1787-1797:
America's First Congressional FloorLeader, in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES
MONROE 127, 127-42 (Stuart Leibiger ed., 2012) (discussing Madison's role as floor leader).
255. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 253, at 295, 297-99 ("My
own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights.").

1658

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

fluctuating political landscape did not alter the nation's permanent
commitment to the maxim of individual rights for the common good.
There is, further, no reason for most Americans to seek a return to an
era when racism, chauvinism, and classism were regarded as legitimate
standards for political and social exclusion. The failures of the founding
generation did not gainsay the nation's obligation to abide by the
constitutional directive of socially responsible governance. In the postReconstruction and post-Civil Rights Era, a vastly more inclusive
comprehension of fundamental rights and the common good has become part
of federal law through statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,256 the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,257 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 58
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 2 59
The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights, and the northern manumission actS26 0 of the
post-Revolutionary Era are just some examples of accomplishments of the
framing generation from which we stand to learn. But they also pursued
inimical policies, like passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793261 and
ratification of the Importation Clause262 and the Three-Fifths Clause,263 that
raise some serious doubt about their judgments and motivations. History is a
tool for understanding various advancements of and failures to live up to the
core commitment of U.S. constitutionalism, but no generation is required to
adopt the complete will of its predecessors, warts and all.
Moreover, given that the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble
attribute sovereignty to the people rather than the Framers of the
Constitution-as might have been the case had the country become a
plutocracy or aristocracy-it's unclear why the views of prominent men of
the day should be more determinative than those of ordinary persons living
during that period.264 Presumably the preferences of persons engaged in
drafting, writing, and ratifying the Constitution through state ratifying
conventions should receive great weight with respect to the document's
256. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2006).
257. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006).
258. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 625-26 (2006).
259. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 47 U.S.C. §§ 225,
611 (2006).
260. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1820, 1820 N.J. Laws 74; Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. 146, 1780 Pa.
Laws 282; see also David Menschel, Note, Abolition Without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut

Slavery 1784-1848, 111 YALE L.J. 183, 184 nn.3-4 (2001) (collecting various abolition measures in
Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe
Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U.

L. REV.
261.
262.
263.

1213, 1257-69 (1993) (discussing the Virginia Manumission Act of 1782).
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
Id. art. 1,§ 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

264. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.

204, 214-15, 220-21 (1980) (discussing the difficulty original intentionalists face in defining the
class of people who adopted the Constitution and then applying it to cases in controversy).
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meaning to the founding generation. But if the Declaration and the Preamble
are to be taken at their word, then a much greater number of people's views
should be taken into account for determining constitutional intentions and
meanings. Professors Keith Whittington and Michael McConnell have gone
further, arguing that originalist judges must give effect to the will of the
people living at the time of ratification. 2 65 But even if that were normatively
correct, the ideas, opinions, and leanings of such a diffuse group cannot be
ascertained with certainty, neither from our vantage point, almost two-and-ahalf centuries later, nor at the time of ratification.
"The People" is, instead, a dynamic constitutional concept embracing
the idea that each generation is obligated to identify rights intrinsic to the
pursuit of happiness and to demand that government provide the legal means
of achieving the general welfare. 2 66 The structural parts of the Constitution
provide the means for the three branches of government to pursue those ends.
The people have exercised their sovereignty not only at the constitutional
ratifying convention: their will is a continuously evolving force that is
exercised through elective politics and representative governance.
Understanding statements about unalienable rights found in the Declaration
or the general welfare in the Preamble certainly requires retrospection. They
are clauses that owe their existence to a specific colonial conflict with
Britain. But like the abstract statements of the Bill of Rights and
Reconstruction Amendments, such as those found in the Ninth
Amendment2 67 and the Equal Protection Clause,2 68 our constitutional
tradition is a steady stream of concretizing through Article V amendments
and, to a less binding degree, precedent, legislation, and regulation. The
broadly stated directive for government to protect rights-in the form of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-for the general welfare-through
substantive and procedural due process-invites debate and resolution, not
stasis. The concrete structures of the Constitution, such as the age at which a
person can become president 269 or the number of senators who represent each

265. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,

ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 124-25, 155-56 (1999) (discussing originalism in the

context of popular sovereignty); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1529 (1989) (book review) ("The

force of the originalist argument is that the people had a right to construct a Constitution, and that
what they enacted should therefore be given effect . . .
266. See supra subpart II(C).
267. See U.S. CONST. amend. LX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
268. See id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
269. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No Person ... shall be eligible to the Office of President ... who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . . .").
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state in Congress,270 are there to provide a framework for achieving the
underlying purpose of representative governance.
Finding themselves in the crosshairs of historical and analytical
criticism, originalists shifted their attention to structural originalism, the
focus of which was on the text and design of the Constitution;
consequentialism, with an emphasis on beneficial results; and "popularsovereignty" originalism. 2 7 1 The most prominent, and currently most
influential, branch draws its inspiration from the presumed original public
meaning. 27 2 That shift did not obviate the problem of identifying an
unambiguous source and understanding of the founding generation. An
advocate for classic originalism critically pointed out that "public meaning
originalism will generate more cases of constitutional indeterminacy than
will the originalism of original intentions." 2 73 There is, furthermore,
disagreement among public-meaning originalists. As Professors Thomas
Colby and Peter Smith recently pointed out, original-meaning scholars are
split between those that credit original understanding to ratifiers, the public,
274
drafters, or hypothetical reasonable persons at the time of ratification.
There is little in common among these disparate camps of originalism except,
as Professor Lawrence Solum has synthetically stated, that they all maintain
there is a fixed-in-time constitutional meaning that constrains modern
interpretation,2 75 but they vociferously differ about the details. Professor
Andrew Koppelman has stated that, ironically, while "[o]riginalists do not
think that their field is in crisis[, t]hey should," because their approaches are

270. See id. amend. XVII, § 1, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State . . . .").
271. See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of
Precedent,91 TEXAS L. REV. 1843, 1870-71 (2013).
272. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION

OF LIBERTY 92-93 (2004) (asserting that originalism has itself changed from a focus on original
intention to original meaning and using Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia as examples of originalists
seeking the original meaning of the text); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997) ("What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I
look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.");
Lee J. Strang, An OriginalistTheory of Precedent: Originalism, NonoriginalistPrecedent, and the
Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 447-71 (2006) (emphasizing that originalism is part of the
Constitution's original meaning); Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the
Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 250-51 (2010) (defending an
original meaning interpretation of the First Amendment); Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed., News Flash:
The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121452412614009067.html ("Justice Scalia's opinion is the finest example of what is now called
'original public meaning' jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.").
273. Richard S. Kay, OriginalIntention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 703, 721 (2009).
274. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 251-52, 25455 (2009).
275. See Larry B. Solum, What Is Originalism?: The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 12, 36 (Grant
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
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so methodologically fragmented.27 6
The different meanings of the
"originalism" label renders untenable the central claim of the movement that
it provides certainty in adjudication.277 The reality, to the contrary, is that, as
with all other approaches, judges who adhere to originalism must make
normative decisions where constitutional clauses are not fully explained by
the historical record, which is often ambiguous or plain nonexistent.2 78
The ideology most originalists espouse is too closely related to the
conservative political agenda to ignore the overlap between it and party
partisanship. 27 9 An originalist judge, whether relying on intentionalism or
public meaning, cannot avoid exercising discretion when deciding facial or
as-applied challenges.28 0 Conservatives tend to think the federal government
has overextended its regulatory reach into areas that the Constitution has left
to state decision makers. Hence an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
mentality, that idealized a period of balanced federalist powers, goes handin-hand with a nostalgic, albeit unworkable, method for understanding the
Constitution. That notion of the past is more ideological than it is historical.

276. Andrew Koppelman, Originalism,Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM.

L. REV. 1917, 1918 (2012); see also Colby & Smith, supra note 274, at 244 ("A review of
originalists' work reveals originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional
interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common
except a misleading reliance on a single label.").
277. It is important to mention, although I am unable to deal with it at any depth in this paper,
that an emerging line of reasoning shared among some post-intentionalist originalists no longer
adopts their forerunners' claims of adjudicatory certainty, but rather claims a more modest
proposition that the Constitution is binding and no changes to it can be made without the Article V
process. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy ... No Problem:
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1563 (2012) ("I am in no

position to make strong claims about the degree of interpretative determinacy of reasonable-person
originalism, either absolutely or comparatively .... [I]t requires a specification of a standard of
proof for interpretative claims; the extent of interpretative indeterminacy will vary, perhaps wildly,
with changes in the standard of proof."); Earl M. Maltz, The Failureof Attacks on Constitutional

Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 50-52 (1987) (admitting that originalist theory cannot
provide absolute certainty but disputing that this is fatal to the originalist position); Martin H.
Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, JudicialReview, ConstitutionalInterpretation,and the Democratic
Dilemma: ProposingA "Controlled Activism" Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1494 (2012)

("Indeed, the irony of the originalist school of interpretation is that an interpretive paradigm
supposedly so committed to the unchanging goals of the Constitution has itself been subjected to
more stylistic changes than spring fashion design.").
278. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 48, 92.
279. See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183, 1192-94

(2011) (arguing that originalism ties conservative politics to the Constitution). As Justice
William J. Brennan Jr. put it, originalism "feigns" deference to the Constitution's Founders, "[b]ut
in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked as humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our
vantage we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific,
contemporary questions." Brennan, supra note 224, at 435. Frank Cross has pointed out that liberal
judges, just as their conservative counterparts, have often deployed originalist arguments for
ideological reasons. Cross, supra note 249, at 49-50.
280. See Colby & Smith, supra note 274, at 292 ("[O]riginalism often fails to constrain judges
because the process of applying the original meaning ... to the particular problem at hand still
leaves room for substantial discretion on the part of the judge to follow her personal preferencesespecially when that meaning . . . is articulated at a broad level of generality.").
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For instance, as Jamal Greene has pointed out, Justice Antonin Scalia's
originalist proclamation in District of Columbia v. Heller281 that the Second
Amendment protects the right to private gun ownership 28 2 is rejected by
almost all historians of the eighteenth century.28 For originalists, then, the
ideological value of labeling something as historical can be of greater value
than analyzing the matter according to the historical record.
History is of vital importance to the interpretation of the Constitution.
However, sifting through precedents, social developments, statutory
emendations, social and political advocacy, and other relevant data of legal
culture does not call for blind adoration of the past. Indeed, the use of
constitutional language appears too rarely in the historical record, often in
contexts unrelated to interpretive canon, to provide definitive answers to
disputes about textual meaning.284 Rather, the previous generations' legal
conclusions, insights into human behavior, legislative enactments,
constitutional adjudications, administrative changes, and the plethora of other
achievements best make sense within a unified framework of national ethos.
That framework is neither beholden to the intent of the founding generation
nor to the public meaning of the Constitution's wording. Originalism
requires inferences outside its stated purpose when addressing questions far
beyond the Framers' foresight, such as the Fourth Amendment's application
to searches and seizures using global positioning systems (GPS), 28 5 thermal
imaging devices,286 and telephone booths.287 Sometimes resort to the historic
record by both the majority and dissent amounts to two reasonable
interpretations of the extant sources that arrive at opposite conclusions. This
was the case in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,2 8 8 which held
unconstitutional a state's limitations on the number of terms representatives
281. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
282. Id at 636. Scalia calls himself a "faint-hearted originalist." Scalia, supra note 11, at 864.
And Barnett has critically asserted that "Justice Scalia is simply not an originalist" because of the
Justice's willingness to sometimes be pragmatic about allowing precedents to override original
meaning. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia'sInfidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"Originalism, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006). But see Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,

supra note 272, at 138-39 ("Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in
an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the
world anew.").
283. Greene, supra note 279, at 1193.
284. Redish & Arnould, supra note 277, at 1502 (noticing that original meaning suffers from
an overwhelming archaeological problem due to the simple lack of relevant data" and the
ambiguous use of words "in entirely unrelated contexts").
285. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that "the Government's
installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a 'search"' (footnote omitted)).
286. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal heat
device to ascertain behavior occurring inside a home was a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
287. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (deciding that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in phone booths, where they are protected against unreasonable searches).
288. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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and senators could serve in the U.S. Congress.289
Legitimacy of
constitutional determinations is, rather, based on whether government action
or inaction is made in accordance with the underlying directive of
representative democracy, established in the Declaration of Independence
and the Preamble, to protect individual rights for the common good. And
that judgment is a contested one. The details must be hashed out in
legislative debates, judicial conferences, and presidential cabinet meetings.
If the people dislike the conclusions reached by powerful actors, they can
vote them out of office and start afresh in the next election cycle. Elected
officials can then engage in the appointment of judicial candidates committed
to the maxim of representative governance.
Jack Balkin has recently proposed a "living originalism" approach,
which frames the Constitution in general terms, based on original "semantic
content. 290 He bases the approach on neither the original intent nor the
original expected application of the Founding Fathers. Living originalism,
instead, requires fidelity to the content of provisions like the Equal Protection
Clause, 291 but recognizes that "changing social demands and changing social
mores" should influence constitutional construction.292 This is a welcome
understanding that mores play a central role in decision making. Balkin
writes that future generations must abide by the Constitution's original
framework.2 93 This "framework consists of the original semantic meanings
of the words in the text (including any generally recognized terms of art) and
the adopters' choice of rules, standards, and principles to limit, guide, and
channel future constitutional construction."294
This approach provides Balkin with a method of explaining the
legitimacy of modern precedents like Roe v. Wade,295 despite the dearth of
grounding that opinion has in any original semantic meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.296
Social
mobilization is crucial to his model "in building the Constitution" and
shaping constitutional construction. 2 97 Balkin does not, however, adopt a
central principle for judicial review and all other functions of governance to

289. Id. at 783.
290. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supranote 51, at 12-13.
291. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalismand the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 551-53 (2009).
292. Id at 551.
293. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 4 ("The text of our Constitution is a
framework.... The ratification of the Constitution begins a constitutional project that spans many
generations. Each generation must do its part to keep the plan going and to ensure that it remains
adequate to the needs and the values of the American people." (citation omitted)).
294. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 817.
295. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
296. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 215-18 ("[T]he right to abortion had
not . . . gained the status of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, when the Court decided
Roe. . . .").
297. Id. at 81-82.
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help explain, justify, or condemn any given trajectory of U.S. social,
political, and constitutional change. A unified principle of governance
provides a grounding on which social groups can demand change. Its simple
ideals do not require advocates for change to be specialists in constitutional
law, they need only seek the protection of individual rights in order to further
the general welfare, where everyone is treated as an equally valuable member
of society regardless of ethnic background, affluence, or political clout. I
agree with Balkin's model of social advocacy but believe that maxim
constitutionalism adds a necessary grounding for construction left out of his
formulation of constitutional advancement.
In this Article I suggest that the central purpose of government is
contained in the maxim that the people have created a representative polity
whose raison d'dtre is the use of constitutional powers to safeguard
inalienable rights to further public good. This is a normative matter, not
merely a semantic one. That norm is stable and provides the initial
constitutional content to publicly eschew intolerance and group animus. The
protection of rights is viewed under my maxim-constitutional approach to be
essential for pluralism because it requires the Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Branches to respect individual difference while administering just
laws for the betterment of the whole. While Balkin is correct that the
Constitution provides the aspiration for "higher law," 298 it is not the
document itself but the human aspiration to live in a society obligated to
protect the individual's unobtrusive pursuit for the good life that is at the core
of legitimate state power. 299 That will to power is best exercised through a
representative government, responsive to the will of constituents but not
beholden to the discrimination of the majority. Freedom of human sexuality,
which the Court recognized under the term "privacy" in Griswold v.
Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas,300 is an example of one constitutional
right that is based on innate human aspirations instead of textual semantics,
original intents, or original meanings. Maxim constitutionalism, then,
regards key constitutional provisions, foremost paragraph two of the

298. Balkin, Nine Perspectives, supra note 295, at 846 (emphasis omitted). Balkin further
writes that some are "underlying principles" of the Constitution that are "implied from various parts
of the text" while others, "like equal protection [and] freedom of speech" appear in the text.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 259. All this is convincing. My difference with
this reading is first that there is a central maxim of constitutional construction that gives meaning to
all the other written and unwritten principles of the Constitution. Secondly, the maxim of
government's obligation to protect individual rights for the common good does not derive from text
but from the people's innate rights to freedom and well-being. The text of the Declaration of
Independence and Constitution binds the federal government to protect and enforce the people's
will through specific constitutional clauses, statutes, judicial decisions, and executive action.
299. Put into the formulation of the Declaration of Independence, the people "institute"
government on the "Foundation o[f] such Principles" and organize "its Powers in such Form, as to
them . .. seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

300. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution, to be
defined by ontological human rights, not determinative of them. The maxim
of individual rights for the common good is that principle upon which all
other constitutional principles must be justified, and it owes its authoritative
place to neither historic semantics nor extant text but to the rational worth of
people establishing a government capable of protecting their essential
interests as the best means of enjoying well-being. Put another way, the
rights protected by the Constitution are preconstitutional.
B.

Living Constitutionalism
In response to Balkin's living originalism, a proponent of a rival school
of interpretation asserted that any form of originalism that calls for
"constitutional construction . . . is not originalist; it is living
constitutionalist." 301 The leading theory of living constitutionalism contends
that judicial precedent is the primary means for evolving and adapting the
Constitution to social progress without needing to formally amend its
antedated provisions. 302 Balkin, in response, suggested that judges should be
unwilling to defend decisions that are not faithful to the Constitution's
original framework.303 Original intent and original meaning proponents
would be even more averse than Balkin to following precedents that deviated
from the will of the Founding Fathers or the framing generation.304
Living constitutionalism is usually associated with judicial decisions
that redefine the meaning of the Constitution. Scholars and judges in this
school of thought argue that constitutional meaning resides not in the text nor
can it be construed through any form of originalism; rather, they seek to
demonstrate how precedents define and alter the significance of various
clauses.305 The Supreme Court is regarded as the locus of constitutional
change, redefining the Constitution through major precedents during the New
Deal, the Civil Rights Era, and throughout the course of U.S. history.306 The
Judiciary is therefore responsible for updating constitutional principles.
Justice William Brennan cautioned that when judges rely on judicial review
to guide constitutional meaning they should act "with full consciousness that

301. Strauss, supra note 241, at 1166.
302. STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 1, 3 (defining the living Constitution as "one that evolves,
changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended").
303. See BALKIN, LIvING ORIGINALISM, supra note 51, at 123-24.
304. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Roe was plainly wrong-even on the
Court's methodology of 'reasoned judgment,' and even more so (of course) if the proper criteria of
text and tradition are applied.").
305. See STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 3, 4 ("Our constitutional system ... has become a
common law system, one in which precedent and past practices are, in their own way, as important
as the written U.S. Constitution itself.").
306. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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it is ... the community's interpretation that is sought."307
Brennan
recognized the value of reviewing the history of the framing, but wrote that
the "ultimate question" is what the words of the Constitution mean today. 308
Brennan's approach left undefined how a Justice should pick among
contradictory community opinions to decide which is worthy of her or his
attention. The maxim of constitutional interpretation I have developed in this
Article might help to fill that gap and prevent exclusionary members of the
community from having too much influence on the Court's reasoning. The
maxim of liberal equality for the common good can provide structure,
requiring the President and Congress to likewise be aware and direct their
public conduct in a manner likely to protect fundamental interests for the
general welfare. As Balkin pointed out, living constitutionalism can also be
associated with the other branches of government guiding constitutional
development. 309 Similarly Professor Bruce Ackerman praised the common
law approach to adaptation but criticized the judge-centered approach for
slighting "the central importance of popular sovereignty."31o
Balkin's and Ackerman's criticisms about placing too much trust in
judges to guide constitutional evolution reject Professor David Strauss's
vigorous defense of common law constitutionalism. Strauss believes that in
the United States "precedent and past practices are, in their own way, as
important as the written U.S. Constitution."31 1 He further argues that
Supreme Court decisions should be at the forefront, or, as he puts it, should
be the "all-but-exclusive" means, of constitutional change, even when the
precedents are not clearly based on the text of the Constitution. 3 12 This
precedent-centered model emphasizes the importance of building on past
understandings and altering them in light of new sensibilities." It takes for
granted the progressive nature of stare decisis and puts resolution of political
disagreement into the hands of unelected judges.3 14 One limitation with such
an approach is that it overlooks analytically faulty precedents and the
307. Brennan, supra note 224, at 434.

308. Id at 438.
309. Balkin, supra note 291, at 561.
310. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1801 (2007).
311. STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 3.

312. Id. at 116. As Professor Strauss writes:
The mechanisms of constitutional change that make up the living Constitution-the
evolution of precedents and traditions-are much more important. The living
Constitution is the primary-I will go so far as to say the all-but-exclusive-way in
which the Constitution, in practice, changes. The formal amendments are a sidelight.
Id. As examples of common law progress made without reliance on originalist or textualist bases,
Strauss names school desegregation, gender equality, checks against state racial discrimination, and
voting apportionment. Id. at 12-15.
313. Id. at 34-36, 38.
314. Judge Wilkinson has stated that living constitutionalists' reliance on judicial supremacism
J. HARVIE WILKINSON Ill, COSMIC
for achieving social improvement is antidemocratic.
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 19-20 (2012).
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Judiciary's periodic regressive decision making. The resolution of disputes
between different democratic factions are typically thought to be in the realm
of bicameral conferences and congressional-executive deal making, not
judicial oversight. 3 15 Strauss's defense of the gradual common law process
of precedents does not gainsay the fault of a system that would have to rely
on judges almost exclusively for progress.316
Supreme Court precedents have well-known high and low points. Some
of the most obvious examples of judicial manipulation of the Constitution to
suit justices' political and economic world views were Dred Scott v.
Sandford " and Lochner v. New York. 1 In both cases, the Court construed
substantive due process to impede legislators from safeguarding the rights of
vulnerable groups and to address a public crisis-the crisis of slavery in the
first and public health in the second.
In the case of slavery, it was
Article V of the Constitution that eventually facilitated change, through
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. 320 Even after the ratification of
the Amendments, the Court denied the constitutionality of a federal statute
that prohibited the segregation of public places of accommodation, like inns

315. See id at 21 (critiquing living constitutionalism for relying on judges to achieve functions
ordinarily left for the political branches of government); see also id. at 22 ("America would be a
much impoverished country if the political branches and the states surrendered all constitutional
discourse to the courts, yet that is exactly what living constitutionalism has encouraged them to
do."). Strauss's passing suggestion that living constitutionalism could be advanced "without
judicial review" does not fully resolve the difficulty of overreliance on the courts. STRAUSS, supra
note 12, at 48. He immediately follows that statement by suggesting that the alternative to common
law living constitutionalism is for Congress to "conscientiously" apply "earlier decisions and
understandings," which begs the question of whose "decisions and understandings" other than
judges would become the authoritative voice on constitutional meaning. Id Strauss doesn't answer
this question, so a bit of conjecture is necessary: If it is the past "decisions and understandings" of
Congress itself, then some central meaning other than simply the abstract notion of updating the
Constitution is necessary to avoid fundamental changes with each election cycle. If the Executive
Branch's "earlier decisions and understandings" could guide the evolution of constitutional
meaning, the risk of autocracy would be heightened contrary to the warnings of the Declaration of
Independence.
316. As examples of gradual change Strauss discusses how Supreme Court doctrine evolved
from Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education and beyond. STRAUSS, supra note 12, at

77-80, 85-92. That the Court eventually got it right is no justification for the personal and social
harms of state Jim Crow practices that were justified on the basis of the Plessy rationale.
317. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
318. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
319. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450 ("[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States ... could hardly be dignified with the name of due process
of law."); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64-65 (finding unconstitutional a statute that regulated the working
hours of bakers for being an abridgment of the right to contract). In Dred Scott the Court struck
down the Missouri Compromise, which Congress had enacted to accommodate Northern efforts to
limit, and Southern efforts to facilitate, the expansion of slavery. See TSESIS, supra note 6, at 6668. The New York law struck down in Lochner addressed the high mortality and epidemic rate
among bakers resulting from their long exposure to airborne flour dust. 198 U.S. at 70-72
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
320. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.

1668

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

and theaters, 321 and in another case turned back a private claimant's assertion
that women have the same privilege and immunity as men to pursue careers,
over the lone dissent of Chief Justice Chase.32 2 With Lochner, the
abandonment of judicial manipulation came through presidentially initiated
programs during the New Deal. At first, the Court refused to go along with
the increased nationalization of economic regulations and only conceded the
validity of federal economic stimulus after striking several pieces of
legislation that had been aimed at ending the Great Depression.323 The
interpretational finality that the Court has bestowed upon itself has
sometimes led to social uplift but at other times hung like a millstone around
the necks of progressive social movements. One of the Constitution's
structural complications is the difficulty of ratifying amendments under
Article V-an even greater complication when the Court prevents the
advancement of civil rights and by its narrow interpretation harms classes of
people seeking to pursue their equal right to happiness.
That said, it is incontrovertible that the Court has also played a visible
role in advancing general welfare and the equal protection of fundamental
rights. But in contrast to Strauss's model, progress has often occurred
through cases that broke with past precedents rather than through gradual,
inevitable change. Brown v. Board of Education was one of the decisions in
which the Court overtly helped end a social evil by relying on the public
value of democracy and the individual value of equal treatment.324 In that
case, the Court cited previous decisions that required limited desegregation,
like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents325 and Sweatt v. Painter,326 but
those two cases were still rooted in the Plessy v. Ferguson regressive
doctrine of separate but equal accommodations. 32 7 The moral clarity of
321. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be
unconstitutional); see also the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 335 (creating a
private cause of action and making it a misdemeanor to deny any U.S. citizen "the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement").
322. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137-39, 142 (1873) (holding that women
were not entitled to enter occupations of their choice on the basis of a national privilege protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment).
323. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION

AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 323-24 (1999) (relating how the Roosevelt administration's economic
policies were efforts to end the Great Depression and provide the impoverished with the opportunity
to prosper); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-

1940, at 231-37 (1963) (discussing Roosevelt's response to the Supreme Court's initial
undermining of his reform efforts and the gradual break from past precedents).
324. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
325. 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950) (holding that a university's segregation policy requiring a
black student to sit apart from other students violated his right to equal protection under the law).
326. 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (holding that a newly constructed segregated law school for
blacks did not provide blacks with an equal educational opportunity).
327. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations
on Bobbitt's Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157, 181 (2008) ("Sweatt

(and McLaurin, decided the same day) simply concluded that the particular acts of segregation did
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Brown came from its deviation from precedent to protect the right of each
student to an equal education and the common value of informed politics.
The unanimous majority recognized that a pluralistic society's obligation to
secure the common good of educated, political participation required the
equal protection of minorities.3 28 When Herbert Wechsler criticized Brown
for not being based on a neutral principle 32 9 he was correct, but his criticism
of the Court's value-rich approach was off target. Brown was in keeping
with the dual constitutional aim of protecting individuals for the mutual good
of the population as a whole. The Declaration of Independence was first to
place civic morality into political discourse. The Constitution later openly
recognized the public's interest in federal enforcement of individual rights
through a variety of amendments, beginning with the Bill of Rights. What
the Bill of Rights failed to require of the states was supplied by incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment, with its grant of congressional authority
to enforce national, constitutional norms and judicial authority to apply them
to the states. The philosopher John Rawls explained the intertwining of
personal and civic interests in education, stressing the "important . . . role of

education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take
part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure
sense of his own worth."330 Similarly, Justice Brennan, writing in a
concurrence, explained that "Americans regard the public schools as a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government." 331
Just as Brown was a definitive break, so too the abandonment of
Lochner made a sharp turn from previous common law constitutionalism. In
332
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
the Court belatedly acknowledged that
legislators can pass minimum wage laws for the sake of "public interest with
respect to contracts between employer and employee."333 In short order, the
Court followed up in United States v. Darby,33 4 upholding the Fair Labor

not satisfy the Plessy doctrine."). Strauss contends that while Plessy remained the law of the land
after McLaurin and Sweatt "the legal landscape" had changed so much "that this progression of
precedents had left separate but equal hanging by a thread." STRAUSS, supra note 12, at 90. There
is no indication, however, that the South understood McLaurin and Sweatt to mandate desegregation
as Brown required. To the contrary, the Court signaled in McLaurin and Sweatt that a truly equal
system of accommodations that separated blacks and whites would not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. See McLaurin, 399 U.S. at 640-41 ("State-imposed restrictions which produce inequalities

cannot be sustained." (emphasis added)); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34 (stating that the two law
schools were not "substantially equal").
328. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
329. Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,

32-34 (1959).
330. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 101.
331. Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
332. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
333. Id. at 392-93.
334. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

1670

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

Standards Act of 193 8.33 This new line of cases, then, carved a legislative
path for Congress to use its Commerce Clause power to set policies for the
general welfare that could better the conditions of individual workers. The
Court recognized the constitutionality of protecting workers by enforcing
statutes that were rationally designed to expand ordinary people's ability to
participate in a national economy. 336- Some judicial opinions, congressional
statements, and academic publications in the late 1930s and early 1940s
claimed a connection between increasing the wages of economically
disempowered individuals and the improvement of living conditions in the
United States as a whole. 33 7 This too was the connection between individual
rights and the general welfare that I argue is at the forefront of legitimateexercise governmental authority.
The possibility of change through the constitutional maxim interlinking
the constitutional values of rights and general welfare, which are set down in
the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution, is
even more readily visible in the gender equality cases. That is, underlying
common law constitutionalism is a maxim that creates the reaches of
legitimacy for the exercise of federal power. The Court only began to
adequately address the endemic harms of gender stereotypes in 1971, with its
decision in Reed v. Reed.338 Decisions that followed discarded the Court's
previous tolerance for chauvinistic policies, such as it had upheld in Bradwell
v. Illinois3 39 and Minor v. Happersett.340 Without overturning either decision,
since the 1970s the Court has swept away its previous rationalizations for

335. Id. at 114 ("Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the
restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the
commerce articles ... injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not
sought to regulate their use.").
336. See id at 109-10, 115 (recognizing Congress's power to prohibit interstate shipment of
goods produced under conditions that perpetuate workers receiving substandard wages).
337. See, e.g., Andrews v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 30 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1939)
("Certainly it cannot be maintained now that Congress may not, in the interests of the general
welfare of the country, prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of the products of under paid
and sweated labor."); To Rehabilitate and Stabilize Labor Conditions in the Textile Industry of the
United States: Hearing on H.R. 9072 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. I

(1936) (discussing "[a] bill to rehabilitate and stabilize labor conditions in the textile industry of the
United States; to prevent unemployment, to regulate child labor, and to provide minimum wages,
maximum hours, and other conditions of employment in said industry; to safeguard and promote
the general welfare; and for other purposes"); David Ziskind, The Use of Economic Data in Labor
Cases, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 647 (1939) ("It may be relatively simple to demonstrate that the wage
and hour law has a reasonable relationship to the health of male workers, the harmonious
functioning of industry and the general welfare of the community.").
338. See 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding that a statutory preference for male estate
administrators violated the Equal Protection Clause).
339. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment claim that
prohibiting women from practicing law was a violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
340. See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174-75 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not protect women's right to vote).
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arbitrary treatment of women in professional and political life. 34 1 The change
was not based on the text of the Constitution, nor can the advancement of
women's rights be readily explained as judicially spearheaded progress. In
fact, it was the outcome of advocacy that had begun with first- and secondwave feminists, not judicial leadership. 3 4 2 In cases like Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs,343 which held states were not immune from
the Family and Medical Leave Act,344 the Court followed the evolution of
more evenhanded family, professional, and political norms; 34 5 the Justices
did not set them. To put it another way, the correctness of the Court's
recognition of women's equality is not based on the Justices' discursive
reliance on past precedents but on the constitutional value of laws
safeguarding intrinsic human equality to enjoy the benefits of living in a
representative republic. 34 6
If the Court had remained recalcitrant in
upholding states' uses of gender stereotypes, its decision making would have
been better adjudged by the maxim of constitutional governance, which sets
the ethos of national constitutionalism, rather than past precedents, which
have sometimes been mired in longstanding prejudices.34 7

341. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that laws that establish
classifications based on gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives to be constitutionally in line with the
Equal Protection Clause); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(stating that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to close
scrutiny).
342. Cf Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1034 (2002) ("Like the gains won by the civil rights
movement, constitutional protections for women's right to vote grew out of decades of social
movement activity; but unlike the gains the civil rights movement won, constitutional protections
for women's right to vote were secured through Article V lawmaking."); Reva B. Siegel, Text in
Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297,
297-98 (2001) (discussing the first and second waves of the feminist movement and arguing that
the text plays a role).
343. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
344. Id. at 725.
345. See id at 729-35 (describing severe state law restrictions on women's employment
sanctioned by earlier Courts, crediting Congress for propelling reform, and upholding the FMLA as
a reasonable legislative response to testimony about continued discrimination through family leave
policies).
346. See id. at 736 (commenting that stereotypes about women in the home and in the
workplace have caused "subtle discrimination"). Lower courts have also recognized "that because
sex-based classifications may be based on outdated stereotypes of the nature of males and females,
courts must be particularly sensitive to the possibility of invidious discrimination in evaluating
them." Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Hibbs v.
Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding "the stereotypical assumption that
women are marginal workers whose fundamental responsibilities are in the home" to be
illegitimate), affd, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that while legislative distinctions based on sex may be upheld for important governmental
interests, gender stereotypes could not overcome intermediate scrutiny).
347. See supra p. 1614 (positioning the maxim of constitutional governance within a general
theory of legal maxims as one that creates a series of binding obligations on the government to its
citizens).
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Strauss's common law living constitutionalism is significant because it
draws attention to the important role precedents play in constitutional
change. But to his account should be added a stable principle against which
developing doctrine must be tested. The principle cannot come solely from
historical sources, many of which are tainted with discriminatory intents and
meanings of the past. Even the text of the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble to the Constitution are not transparent.
C.

Normative Compass
The directive for government to protect equal rights for the betterment
of the whole lays a constitutional foundation on which each generation can
build a legal infrastructure for personal achievement and social improvement.
A maxim grounded in the principles of the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble to the Constitution establishes a consistent, stable, and reliable
standard for regulation and policy making. But these documents' directive of
governance will not always provide lawmakers and judges with obvious
answers to pressing dilemmas. Rather, the maxim of governance is the
people's overarching directive that government must follow, be it the
legislature in enacting laws, the executive in enforcing them, or the judiciary
in adjudicating their validity or application.
When confronted with conflicting constitutional pressures from the
public and private sectors, a well-established principle of adjudication
requires the Court to balance relevant interests. 34 8 In the previous Supreme
Court term, for instance, the Justices found that even though the majority of
states and the federal government permitted mandatory lifelong
incarcerations for juveniles convicted of murder in adult courts, the
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment. 34 9 The Court earlier had held
unconstitutional the statutes of thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government that provided life-without-parole sentences for
some juveniles convicted of nonhomicidal offenses. 350 The lesson from these
decisions is that the effort to achieve social justice-in these cases retribution
and deterrence for crimes-cannot be based on procedures that inadequately
guard an individual's ability to expect a sentence commensurate with his or

348. The Court annunciated the best known constitutional balancing test for civil cases in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Due Process requires the following three
considerations:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. at 335.
349. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2471-73 (2012).
350. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023, 2034 (2010).
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her culpability. While incarceration is a necessary restraint on liberty to
protect the public, it does not follow that lifelong deprivation of liberty, with
its negative impact on juvenile convicts' ability to pursue a good life, is
justified.
In both cases, the Court assessed the social standard and national
consensus for heavy punishments against juvenile offenders but found that
the dominant statutory regime was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
without sufficient judicial latitude to engage in individualized reflection on a
juvenile defendant's lower blameworthiness.3 5 A stable principle of justice
exercised in a civil society should recognize the directive of balancing a
state's need to safeguard public peace and an individual's need for fair
treatment that does not arbitrarily deprive one of the ability to pursue
happiness. Justice Brennan, though a living constitutionalist, recognized that
the Constitution contained "substantive value choices" that prevent
legislatures from being hijacked by majoritarian processes.352
Thus, as many scholars have pointed out, the Court has often functioned
as a countermajoritarian institution.
But the judiciary is not entirely
immune from political influences,3 54 as the Court demonstrated in its
adoption of the gun lobby's interpretation of the Second Amendment 3 5 5 and
its order in favor of the Republican Party to stop the Florida ballot recount
during the George Bush-Al Gore presidential election of 2000.356
Additionally, the Supreme Court has also periodically given more weight to
state policies than civil rights legislation. For instance, a bare majority
decided that sovereign immunity trumped the rights of the disabled under the

351. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (stating that previous juvenile-conviction precedents and
"our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a
sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult"); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030
(commenting that the "irrevocable judgment" accompanying a sentence of life without parole is
inappropriate "in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender's ... limited moral culpability").
352. Brennan, supra note 224, at 437.
353. For some of the voluminous literature on the Court's role in preventing majorities harming
minorities see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that the "root difficulty" of judicial review
is that it is a "counter-majoritarian force in our system"); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History
in ConstitutionalScholarship, 88 VA. L. REv. 485, 523-607 (2002) (describing a wide variety of
countermajoritarian approaches); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: A New Perspectiveon the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOwA L. REv.
1287, 1340-41, 1351-52 (2004) (arguing that "taking political ignorance into account severely
weakens the claim that judicial review of federalism is ... countermajoritarian").
354. See Posner, supra note 3, at 52-53 (discussing political motivations in the judicial
process).
355. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment guarantees a private right to gun ownership); see also Siegel, supra note 242, at 23739 (tracking the historical ideals and influence of the gun lobby and attributing their influence to the
Heller majority).
356. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000).
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Americans with Disabilities Act 5 and the elderly under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 5
In these cases, the Court wasn't
acting as a countermajoritarian institution, preventing minority abuse; to the
contrary, it struck down legislation that protected members of vulnerable
groups' abilities to participate in the common good of civil society.
The Supreme Court has increasingly limited Congress's ability to
perform its functions "in [a] manner most beneficial to the people," a policy
concern long recognized to be a legitimate use of legislative authority. 359 In
Chief Justice Marshall's structural scheme, the Court has for more than two
centuries retained the right to determine whether a law was "repugnant to the
constitution" because "the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant
to it." 360 In a Warren Court decision, Cooper v. Aaron,3 6' the Supreme Court
asserted even more clearly that the "federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution" 362 and ordered that the South
desegregate pursuant to the earlier holding in Brown v. Board of Education.
While the Court identified its power to review government conduct in order
to preserve the Constitution as the supreme law against overreaching of
either of the other two branches of government or the states, 6 nothing in
either of those cases asserted that the Court was the exclusive interpreter of
the document. Indeed, such an exclusive grant of power to the unelected
judiciary seems to be counterintuitive given that the obligation to safeguard
rights for the general welfare places duties on all three branches. In Cooper,
in particular, the point was that no state entity should undermine a Supreme
Court holding interpreting the Constitution,36 4 but that decision did not
remove from Congress or the President any authority to initiate policies
furthering constitutional values.
Justice William Brennan's majority opinion in Katzenbach v.
Morgan,365 decided eight years after Cooper, brought the point home, finding
357. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that state
employers are immune from private monetary damages claims under the ADA).
358. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that state employers are
immune from private monetary claims under the ADEA).
359. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("[W]e think the sound
construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, . . . which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people.").
360. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (establishing judicial
review).
361. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
362. Id. at 18.
363. Id. (stating that "[elvery state legislator and executive and judicial officer" is bound to
support the Constitution, which includes the interpretations handed down by the Court in its
decisions).
364. Id at 18-19 (explaining that in order for the Constitution to remain the "supreme law of
the land," no exercise of state power may contravene the judgments of the courts of the United
States).
365. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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that Congress had the authority to explore and exercise the range of its
Fourteenth Amendment Section Five power. 36 6 The express constitutional
grant of authority in the Enforcement Clause did not, the Court found,
relegate Congress "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional."367
Instead the Court took a position, which the Rehnquist Court later
repudiated,3 68 that Section Five "is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 36 9 Taken together, Cooper and Morgan required Congress to
follow judicial interpretation but also recognized that legitimate
congressional initiative can be based on the independent exercise of
constitutional authority, without having to wait for judicial guidance.
Judicial deference to congressional expansion of rights coupled with its
interpretational assertiveness required a balanced effort for safeguarding
constitutional rights and structural integrity for governing a pluralistic
society, committed both to popular representation and countermajoritarian
norms. According to the Cooper-Morganline of reasoning, the Constitution
grants the Judicial and Legislative Branches separate powers to protect rights
against state practices that arbitrarily exclude some segment of the
population or individual from enjoying the basic rights of education and
political participation.
In several subsequent cases, the Court augmented its power and, in the
process, diminished Congress's ability to set agendas in keeping with the
maxim directive of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the
Constitution. Beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores,3 70 the Rehnquist
Court systematically narrowed Congress's Section Five powers. 37 1
it
implicitly overruled Morgan, holding, instead, that Congress cannot rely on
Section Five to investigate and promulgate laws to expand rights beyond
those the Court previously determined to be protected by the Constitution.372

366. See id. at 650 ("By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18."). Morgan arose as a challenge to Congress's
earlier reliance on Section Five for passing the Voting Rights Act's prohibition against a state's use
of literacy tests as a precondition of voting. Id. at 643-46.
367. Id. at 648-49.
368. See infra text accompanying notes 371-85.
369. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651. In Morgan, the Court adopted Brennan's earlier concurrence,
which had asserted that the "proper perspective [views] § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ... as a
positive grant of legislative power." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1966) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
370. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
371. Id. at 519.
372. See id. at 536 (holding that the RFRA is unconstitutional because it cannot be considered
enforcement legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).

1676

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1609

Congress may only pass laws that are congruent and proportional to a
judicially defined constitutional violation.373
This rule of interpretation should have rung hollow in a representative
democracy founded on the notion that the people are sovereign. But here, in
Boerne, the Court was announcing that it would have none of it. Henceforth,
only the unelected guardians seated on the Court would announce what
constituted a constitutionally protected right; and, while litigants could
engage the federal judiciary, the people would be excluded from that process.
The Court then continued on the same trajectory in Kimel, which found
Congress could not impose the private monetary remedy of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) on state employers.37 4 The
majority in Kimel invoked state sovereign immunity against private-party
causes of action by citizens of their own state. 7 As Justice David Souter
pointed out in a previous dissent, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
judge-made common law that the Supreme Court had elevated to a
constitutional doctrine3 7 6 and, in Kimel, employed to trump Congress's
Section Five authority to provide relief against state employer
3 78
discrimination.377 So too in University ofAlabama v. Garrett,
the majority
rejected Congress's power to require that state agencies abide by the national
norm for the treatment of the disabled as it was codified in the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). 3 79 Resorting to its self-proclaimed exclusivity
of constitutional interpretation, the Court rejected Congress's capacity to
advance and protect the ability for a vulnerable group-the disabled-to
bring claims against state employers.38 0
In another blow to popular sovereignty, the Court, in United States v.
Morrison,381 struck down a law passed by Congress with widespread
bipartisan support, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).382 Congress

373. Id. at 519-20.

374. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
375. Id
376. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 183-84 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(asserting that while "[t]he Hans doctrine was erroneous ... it has not previously proven to be
unworkable or to conflict with later doctrine" and hence is a part of stare decisis but arguing that
where Congress clearly abrogated that sovereign immunity, as it did with the ADEA, the restriction
against federal courts hearing private suits does not govern); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1890) (holding that states are immune from federal suits brought by private parties who are citizens
of that state). But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999) ("Although the sovereign
immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and
history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.").
377. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92.
378. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
379. Id at 374.
380. See id. at 365 (prefacing its analysis with reference to the "long-settled principle that it is
the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees").
381. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
382. Id at 605, 627; Preeta D. Bansal, The Supreme Court's Federalism Revival and
Reinvigorating the "Federalism Deal, " 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 447, 451 (2007)
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passed the statute to protect the victims of sexual violence against gender
discrimination in state courts.383 This was the sort of Section Five use of
power that Morgan envisioned to be at the discretion of Congress. 384it
involved the protection of victims of violence and aimed at social welfare by
providing a remedy for individual litigants and preventing the drain of
billions of dollars from the national economy resulting from battered women
missing work and receiving healthcare.
The principal problem with the rules announced in the Boerne line of
cases was not simply that they were not originalist 3 86 nor that they were
inconsistent with prior precedent like Morgan and, therefore, out of step with
living constitutionalism. 3 87 The Court's main failing in Kimel, Garrett,and
Morrison was to reject that Congress could use its Section Five power to act
as a coequal player for the expostulation of the constitutional directive for
protecting liberal equality for the common good.
The Declaration's directive for government to set policies "most likely
to effect [the people's] Safety and Happiness"38 8 and the Preamble's mandate
to "promote the general Welfare" 389 place an obligation on all three branches
of government. The Court is not exclusively responsible for identifying
fundamental rights essential for the pursuit of happiness and engagement in
the common good of social governance. Indeed, the Legislative Branch will
often have more resources and hear from far more constituents,3 90 making it

("[A] ... coalition of states supported the creation of a federal civil cause of action against gender
violence enacted by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress in the [VAWA]."); Jamal
Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1766 (2012) ("VAWA
passed Congress with bipartisan support.").
383. J. Randy Beck, The Heart ofFederalism:Pretext Review ofMeans-EndRelationships, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 435 (2003) (recounting the congressional purpose behind the passage of
VAWA).
384. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 658 (1966) (finding constitutional the Voting
Rights Act provision prohibiting enforcement of the English literacy requirement and citing it as a
correct exercise, under Section Five of congressional discretion in determining whether particular
legislation secures the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
385. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632-33 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing congressional findings that
"violent crime against women costs this country at least [S] 3 billion ... a year.... [E]stimates
suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs
of domestic violence" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
386. For a discussion of reasons why Boerne's interpretation of Section Five is not historical,
see Erwin Chemerinsky, Politics,Not History, Explains the Rehnquist Court, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 647, 650-51 (2004).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 371-85; cf Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the
Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 676-77 (2006)
(characterizing Justice Kennedy's Boerne decision as narrowing former interpretations of
constitutional rights).
388. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
389. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
390. See Mary B. Mazanec, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 1,
26 (2012), available at http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/crsll_annrpt.pdf (stating that the
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critical for the people to engage in the popular sovereignty guaranteed by
these statements of constitutional governance.
The judicial-centered
approach announced in Boerne, Kimel, Garrett, and Morrison forecloses
constituents who wish to effectively lobby their congressional representatives
to advocate for laws necessary for eradicating historical or novel forms of
discrimination from doing so. The Supreme Court's narrow reading of
Section-Five-reconstructed federalism disrupts the structure of governance
set by the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution.
The Constitution-the structure of which I believe allows the Supreme
Court and Congress to uphold and identify fundamental rights essential for
the public good-provides a balanced approach to protecting the common
social interests in equality, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The
balance is between the Court's countermajoritarian function and Congress's
representative role. This balance provides official channels for carrying out
the Declaration and the Preamble's directive to protect individual rights for
the general welfare. It is, therefore, essential that neither the Court nor
Congress hamstrings the other's authority to safeguard essential rights for
pursuing the common good. When Congress passes a law, such as Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," that is rationally related to the socially
beneficial goal of protecting civil rights, the Court lacks the authority to
strike it. Likewise, when it is the Court that asserts a right, such as
privacy,392 it is not within Congress's power to override the ruling.
D.

NeutralPrinciples

An evaluation of whether public policies and judicial opinions protect
the people's pursuit of happiness and provide for the general welfare can be
either normative or procedural. This section analyzes a number of neutral
standards of interpretation and evaluates them in light of the substantive
maxim constitutionalism that I have proposed in this Article.
Professor Philip Bobbitt developed a discursive analysis for judicial
reasoning. His six modalities-historical, textual, structural, doctrinal,
ethical, and prudential-of legitimate legal analysis provide no normative
foundation for interpretation.
Bobbitt articulated the rationales judges

Congressional Research Service, an organization whose mission is to provide Congress with policy
research and analysis, had a Fiscal Year 2011 appropriation of I11 million).
391. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000e (2006).
392. The Supreme Court has identified a variety of privacy rights in a series of cases. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding that the Due Process Clause encompasses
a right to sexual privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing reproductive
privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding it unconstitutional for a state
to intrude into the privacy of marital contraceptive decisions).
393. BOBBIT, supra note 128, at 12-13; see Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics,

72 TEXAS L. REv. 1869, 1913-14 (1994) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Reflections] (refusing to make
normative claims about the legitimacy of the modalities of argument as an abstract principle and
explaining that a "proposition of constitutional law is true if it forms part of the rationale offered in
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provide for their holdings, but he recognized no value to a metatheory.394
The modalities are descriptive, but Bobbitt's methodology contained no
underlying constitutional purpose for determining whether a judge's reliance
on them is purely formalistic or substantively valid.
The inquiry that I have suggested is at the root of maxim
constitutionalism, of whether policy protects individual rights for the
common good, plays no explicit role in his modalism. Even if it falls under
Bobbitt's "ethical" mode,395 it is one value rather than, as I suggest, the core
value of the Constitution. Hence a judge applying any or several of the six
accepted rationales need not reflect on whether a law infringes on
fundamental rights and excludes a group from the enjoyment of mutual
benefits of representative democracy. The modes do not discriminate
between their proper use by proslavery antebellum judges, by judges in Jim
Crow courtrooms, or by judges in post-Civil Rights Era settings. The ethical
semantic in his system lacks an objective component that could be used to
test a judge's use of normative language against some ontological norm of
human nature or empirical analysis of representative democracy.
The modal approach only allows for neutral rather than normative
criticism of judicial opinions. Bobbitt's discussion of Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in the Dred Scott case, for instance, did not criticize the Court for the
faulty holding that free and enslaved blacks were an "inferior class of
beings" who could not hold citizenship in the United States.39 7 Bobbitt only
drew attention to the textual implications of Taney's reasoning:
A textual modality may be attributed to arguments that the text of
the Constitution would, to the average person, appear to declare, or
deny, or be too vague to say whether, a suit between a black
American citizen resident in a state and a white American citizen
resident in another state, is a "controversy between citizens of
different states." I would imagine that the contemporary meaning
of these words is rather different than that which Taney found
them to mean to the framers and ratifiers of 1789.398
This retrospective statement left unexamined whether Taney's assertion that
the Constitution precluded blacks from being citizens violated their
support of a legal decision and if that rationale is composed of the kinds of arguments recognized in
legal practice as legitimate").
394. See BOBBITT, supra note 128, at xii-xvii (explaining how turning the modalities of
interpretation into tools for validating ideological preferences undermines the legitimating force the
modalities strived to find in constitutional law).
395. Id at 13 (defining the "ethical" modality as based on "deriving rules from those moral
commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution").
396. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 393, at 1914 (denying that the types of constitutional
argument are capable of being validated through his theory in a way external to the arguments' use
in practice).
397. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).
398. BOBBITT, supra note 128, at 14 (involving Article III's provision for federal diversity
jurisdiction).
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inalienable and political rights and, thereby, diminished their opportunity to
enjoy the common good.
Contemporary critics of Dred Scott, like abolitionists and the then
newly formed Republican Party, certainly thought Taney to be acting against
the nation's normative standards. 9
A meeting of "colored" citizens in
New Bedford, Massachusetts determined that Dred Scott was not merely a
wrong statement as a matter of interpretation but substantively flawed.400
Their meeting convened with a statement that "colored people of this country
have ever prove[n] . . . their loyalty to its interests and general welfare.AOI
Participants resolved that "the infamous 'Dred Scott' decision is a palpably
vain, arrogant assumption, unsustained by history, justice, reason[,] or
common sense." 402
The New Hampshire Senate and House of
Representatives jointly issued a statement that the people of that state
confirmed their "devoted attachment to the principles embodied in the
Declaration of Independence" and the Preamble to the Constitution and,
therefore, rejected the DredScott decision as "subversive." 4 03
Merely looking at the text, without reflecting on national ideals,
Bobbitt's description of the case leaves the impression that it is contemporary
linguistic usage that should be determinative of constitutional meaning rather
than some central purpose of representative constitutionalism or intrinsic
dignity of humans, irrespective of their race. A normative approach to
interpretation makes clear that Dred Scott is not only a textual misreading of

399. A Milwaukee newspaper summed up a Republican Convention that had convened in
Madison, Wisconsin at the end of summer 1857:
Our Platform, too, is as good as our ticket. It reaffirms the principles upon which the
original organization of our party was based; renews the pledges of opposition to the
extension of slavery, to the Fugitive Slave Act, and to the admission of any more slave
States into the Union; denounces all proscription on account of birth, creed, or color:
declares for equal rights to all citizens of the Republic, native, or foreign-born; takes
high and impregnable grounds against the Dred Scott decision, and on that issue
appeals from the dicta of partizan Judges to the great tribunal of THE PEOPLE. We
stand, therefore, in this canvass as the advocates of FREE SOIL and FREE LABOR, of
EQUAL RIGHTS and CIVIL and RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, of STATE SOVEREIGNTY and the
true Interpretation of the Federal Constitution; and as the opponents of slavery
aggression and slavery extension, of political proscription, and of judicial
misconstructions of the great charter, ordained and established by the fathers and
founders of our Republic "to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and
secure the blessings of LIBERTY to ourselves and our posterity."
The Republican Ticket and Platform, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Sept. 8, 1857, at 2. Southern
newspapers took a decidedly states' rights view of Dred Scott, and rejected abolitionist claims of
individual rights and general welfare. See, e.g., The Fruits of Constitutional Construction,
CHARLESTON MERCURY, Apr. 22, 1857, at 2 (characterizing the Northern position with respect to
Dred Scott as "consolidatio[nist]" and rejecting abolitionism in the name of the general welfare as
"a simple question of a grant of power").
400. W.C.N., Meeting of Colored Citizens, LIBERATOR (Bos.), July 9, 1858, at 112.

401. Id.
402. Id.
403. NationalResolves, N.H. STATESMAN (Concord), Aug. 13, 1859, at 4.
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the Declaration of Independence,404 the nation's history,405 and judicial
authority. 4 0 6 Taney's principal flaw was normative: His opinion denied that
the "general welfare" of the nation must apply to all persons in the United
States, not merely those of European descent.40 7
Following the Civil War, textual formalism led to the Court's adoption
of a narrow reading of the state action requirement in the Civil Rights
Cases.4 08 In that case, the Court interpreted the words of the Fourteenth
Amendment-"[n]o state shall"409-to mean that the Amendment applies
only to public forms of discrimination.41 0 That decision struck down a
national desegregation statute, undermining the purposes of Reconstruction,
in the name of literal textualism. 4 1 1 The historian Eric Foner asserted that the
doctrine remains "a major barrier" to the promotion of racial equality.4 12
And Michael Klarman similarly asserted that the state action requirement is
"among the most formidable barriers to securing racial justice."4 3 Several
scholars-including Robert Glennon, John Nowak, Charles Black, William
Van Alstyne, Ken Karst, and Harold Horowitz4 14-have suggested a

404. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (asserting that the Framers

regarded the Declaration of Independence to only apply to whites and not to blacks).
405. Chief Justice Taney claimed misleadingly that at the time of the Articles of Confederation
blacks were neither citizens of the United States nor of their own states. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
418-19. But see id at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis corrected Taney, listing several
states as examples:
At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-born
inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of
those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the
franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.
Id

406. In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney determined that a federal court could not hear Dred
Scott's freedom suit on the basis of diversity jurisdiction because he and his family could not
acquire state citizenship. Id. at 454 (majority opinion).
407. For a more thorough discussion of Dred Scott and Chief Justice Taney's flawed reasoning,
see TSESIS, supra note 6, at 77-82.
408. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
409. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
410. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 ("It is State action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.");
see also id at 19 ("This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it takes immediate and
absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns, public conveyances, and places
of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation on the same subject, or only allows it
permissive force.").
411. See id. at 25 ("[N]o countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be
found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of
authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void. . . .").
412. Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History ofReconstruction-and Vice-Versa, 112
COLUM. L. REv. 1585, 1604 (2012).
413. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 152 (2004).
414. See Robert J. Glennon Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 225-26 (noting that the
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descriptive way for courts to surmount that barrier by conceiving certain
forms of private discrimination to be tied with state involvement, such as a
court's enforcement of racist real estate covenants. 4 15 These scholars have
offered an analytically sound position, given the oft ambiguity of the publicprivate dichotomy. Licensing, for instance, is required of most business
activities, from running a hot dog stand to trading secured instruments.416
But the Court has maintained the validity of the state action doctrine, partly
relying on it in Morrison to strike down the civil action provision of the
Violence Against Women Act. 4 17
The core problem with the state action doctrine is not only that it often
leads courts to overlook the role of states in private-business discrimination,
but also that it prevents Congress from passing laws to protect an
individual's right to enjoy public accommodations on the basis of equality.
Current public-accommodations laws can only be passed to regulate
activities with a substantial effect on the national economy. 4 18 This is
unfortunate because Congress may find that certain wrongs that bear little or
minimal economic harm-such as discrimination against a sparse,
geographically isolated, unincorporated organization; be they committed to
humanism, the rights of the handicapped, or some other lawful
association419-require action to abide by the directive of constitutional
governance of the Preamble and Declaration.
On the ethical side, Bobbitt recognized that the Declaration of
Independence provides the "political basis for the idea of the constitution.420
To him, the Declaration's guarantee of "[u]nalienable rights" means that the
people have not, and indeed cannot, renounce their sovereignty over state

traditional "all-or-nothing theory" of state action became increasingly difficult to accept); Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and
California'sProposition14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (contemplating the consequences of a

shift away from strict state action doctrine); William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State
Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5-8 (1961) (addressing the ad hoc state action doctrines protruding
from Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 218 (1957) (stating that
a private corporation may be an unconstitutional state actor even though it is not a state agent).
415. Their suggestions tie back to the Court's holding that court enforcement of racial
covenants is a form of state action. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
416. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(1) (2006) (requiring brokers and dealers of securities to
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane,
The Policy and Politics of CharterMaking: The Story of New York City's 1989 Charter,42 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 723, 873 (1998) (stating that operating a hot dog stand on a New York City street

requires a license).
417. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-23 (2000).
418. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) ("Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
419. Cf Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 275 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("I recognize too that some isolated and remote lunchroom which sells only to local
people and buys almost all its supplies in the locality may possibly be beyond the reach of the
power of Congress to regulate commerce . . .
420. BOBBITr, supra note 128, at 4-5.
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power.421 Bobbitt is certainly basing this point on the people's retention of
sovereignty. He did not, however, take the Declaration to be an overarching
statement of national purpose to protect intrinsic human rights and thus did
not couple it with the Preamble's mandate that government "promote the
general Welfare[] and secure the Blessings of Liberty." 2 2 This is the maximbased approach I have developed in this Article. But for Bobbitt, "American
constitutionalethos" is of a more limited nature, "confined to the reservation
of powers not delegated to a limited government." 42 3 His ethical modality
refers to the "characterization of American institutions and the role within
them of the American people."42 4 But Bobbitt provided no metamethod for
identifying whether, at any given point in history, American institutions and
the people involved in them aimed to protect fundamental rights for the
general welfare or were energized into relying on a modal judgment by
prejudice and exclusion. Without acknowledging an underlying purpose,
Bobbitt's modes of legal practice provide no means of deciding whether
judicial holdings and explanations are formalistically logical but unfaithful to
the nation's core commitment to sustaining equal liberty for the common
good. The modalities, then, are not means of determining whether a judicial
rationale is true to an underlying constitutional purpose but "no more than
instrumental, rhetorical devices to be deployed in behalf of various political
ideologies."42 5
Bobbitt is, of course, not the first to defend neutral principles. Professor
Herbert Wechsler's exposition of neutral principles was not only descriptive
but also required a court to parse the meaning of the Constitution and apply it
to specific cases without being influenced by the judge's personal and
political convictions.426 In his best known exposition of this line of
reasoning, Wechsler critiqued the Court's principled holding against school
42 7
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.
Legitimacy lies in a judge's
following precedents announced in previous decisions, applying the doctrine
of stare decisis, without deviating from them to achieve desired ends. 4 2 8 And
with the Brown decision, Wechsler wrote that, as much as he supported the
sentiment for desegregating schools, he could find no neutral constitutional
principle for the decision.429

421. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
422. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
423. BOBBITT, supra note 128, at 21 (endnote omitted).
424. PHILIP BOBBIr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1982).
425. BOBBITT, supra note 128, at 22.
426. See Wechsler, supra note 329, at 19 (repeating that "even though [an] action involves
value choices" courts have the duty to treat constitutional cases in an "entirely principled" manner
without regard for "any immediate result that is involved").
427. Id. at 32-33.
428. Id. at 16.
429. Id at 34.
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Wechsler's reasoning was suspect for a number of reasons. For one,
certain portions of the Constitution-like the Equal Protection Clause, the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and
the First Amendment protections for speech and religion-appear to be value
rich, in need of interpretation, and not neutral in value. Their evaluation and
the reevaluation of past interpretations of them-like Plessy v. Ferguson,
which Brown functionally overturned 4 30-are based on a deep understanding
of the entire structure of popular governance, with a concomitant respect for
inalienable rights and equal legal status. The Equal Protection Clause was
one of the great culminations of the Union victory over the Confederacy,
and, even under the most minimal reading, it secured equality of citizenship
for blacks and persons of all races. Although not explicitly mentioned in
Brown, the right to civic participation also played a role in the Court's
reasoning. The First Amendment secured political speech, and its safeguards
were incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. And the Brown
Court found that integrated education was essential for equality and civic
dialogue.43 1 Where a new case before the Court concerns a moral dilemma
for society, the Supreme Court must stay true to stare decisis but also choose
whether to overrule its past error or to broadly interpret its previous
decisions.4 32
Furthermore, where previous decisions have misguided constitutional
law-as was the case with Plessy v. Ferguson-a new course must be
steered, one that deviates from past precedents but is true to constitutional
principle. This position bears some overlap with Ronald Dworkin's assertion
that the Supreme Court should make decisions on the basis of the principle
"that government must treat people as equals."4 33 The analysis in this Article
demonstrates that the nation adopted the equality principle of the Declaration
of Independence into the Constitution and made it a directive to govern the
conduct of all three branches. This is by no means neutral but instead maxim
oriented.
I disagree with Dworkin, however, that reflection "about how the
general welfare is best promoted" should play no role in constitutional
interpretation.4 34 To the contrary, the Preamble mandates policy reflections
on the general welfare, and such reflection allows for the differentiation
between the exclusionary reading of equality in Plessy and the inclusionary

430. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-91, 495 (1954) (noting that the "separate
but equal" doctrine made its first appearance at the Court in Plessy and stating that this doctrine
"has no place" in the field of public education (internal quotation marks omitted)).
43 1. See id. at 493 (stating that equal education is the "very foundation of good citizenship").
432. Mark Tushnet has pointed out how every new case is distinct from past relevant holdings,
requiring judges to decide between various possible constructions-narrow and broad-of old
principles when applying them to new dilemmas. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique ofInterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 814-15 (1983).
433. RONALD DWORKIN, A MAITER OF PRINCIPLE 69 (1985).
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version in Brown. It was only in the latter that the Court formally recognized
that equality must include the ranks of all Americans, joined together in the
pluralistic efforts of representative governance. 4 3 5 The task of identifying
how the maxim of equal liberty for the common good applies to specific
social dilemmas requires a balance of authority between the President,
Congress, and the Supreme Court. It is for all of us as a people to determine,
reconsider, and hone the meaning of representative democracy. The balance
of rights and public needs remains a policy-by-policy, case-by-case, law-bylaw, and regulation-by-regulation determination. All of these avenues of
lawmaking must be undertaken without offending the central maxim of
constitutionalism. There will inevitably be conflicts between the branches.
As I have explained elsewhere, in these interbranch policy disputes,
legislative expansion of equal rights to discrete and insular minorities should
take precedence over constitutional common law that constricts national
authority.4 36 Congress as well as the Court can identify groups that have
historically been persecuted and are covered by Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement clauses. But space constraints in this Article do
not allow me to elaborate any further on this balance of powers.
Conclusion
The core purpose of representative constitutionalism is the protection of
individual rights for the general welfare. This maxim of governmental
purpose for adjudication, regulation, and legislation is incorporated into the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. That
ideal purpose of representative democracy is at the core of U.S. governance.
It sets the directive for all three branches to legitimately exercise their
respective powers. The historical failures to live up to that standard did not
alter the Constitution's aspirational value and objective. To the contrary, its
existence provides the stable, public goal of legitimate progress within a
verifiable legal norm. The specific powers enumerated in the Constitution
and allocated to the several branches of government provide the structure to
achieve the aim for which the people have established these United States.

435. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89

GEO. L.J. 1, 81-82 (2000) (arguing that Brown "sought to bring people together in inclusive
institutions").
436. Tsesis, supra note 54, at 735-41.
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